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1. Introduction 
FRAND commitments, to provide an irrevocable commitment in writing to offer to license 
to all third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, have now become a 
common practice of licensing matters in standards to ensure effective access to the 
standards.1 FRAND plays an important role in the interplay between patents and standards. 
Discussions over FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs), especially in 
telecommunication sector, have been frequently raised about the interpretation of FRAND, 
royalty levels, seeking injunctions and etc. In the absence of clear and definite legal 
provisions and relevant case law, little effort has been made by EU competition authorities 
to solve disputes as such. The only case that has been intervened by anti-trust authorities is 
seeking injunctions.   
In fact, debate on whether there is a need for antitrust intervention in FRAND 
commitments is in full swing among various legal scholars. The most influential 
representatives are Philippe Chappatte’s work2 and Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato’s 
reply to the work (hereinafter ‘the reply’)3, as the former approves of an anti-trust 
intervention, while the latter disapproves. This article, inspired by these two works, tries to 
explore whether there is a need for EU competition law to intervene in 
FRAND-encumbered SEP licensing issues. If the answer is affirmative, is such antitrust 
intervention absolute or conditional?  
In order to see whether there exists a necessity for anti-trust intervention, the first step is to 
look into the background where FRAND commitments emerge. What purposes do FRAND 
commitments intend to achieve? Part 2 introduces the appearance of FRAND 
commitments as an industry solution in the context of standardization, which is also 
recommended by the Horizontal Guidelines to address risks invoked in the process of 
standardization such as patent hold-up and royalty stacking. This part also narrows down 
                                                        
1 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para285. 
2 Philippe Chappatte, ‘FRAND Commitments—the Case for Antitrust Intervention’ (August 2009) European 
Competition Journal, 319. 
3 Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, ‘FRAND Commitments and EC Competition Law: A Reply to Phillippe 
Chappatte’ (April 2010) European Competition Journal. 129. 
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the scope of the article to telecommunication sector with regard to SEP licensing issues. 
Part 3 discovers the nature and characteristics of FRAND commitments. This part digs into 
the contractual nature of FRAND and its inherent vagueness, as well as a discussion about 
the necessity to clear such vagueness. The purpose of this part is to offer a better 
understanding of FRAND in itself which might help to prepare for the further discussions 
of different circumstances where FRAND fails to function as expected. Indeed, to certain 
extent, the failure of FRAND in addressing relevant standardization risks is already 
embedded in the FRAND commitments per se. 
Part 4 inquires more specifically into the core question whether competition law shall 
intervene with FRAND-encumbered SEPs. This part first examines the legal framework 
for FRAND-encumbered SEPs. Then it discusses theoretically under legal provisions 
whether there is a place for competition rules to apply. After that, it takes a careful look 
into perceived problems in different circumstances where even with the FRAND 
commitments, standardization risks still exist and FRAND commitments per se might also 
bring about anti-competitive effects to the relevant market. Those risks examined in this 
article focus on conditions where there is no FRAND commitments at all, where licensing 
parties breach FRAND commitments and where FRAND commitments do not function 
quite well in preventing anti-competitive effects. Also, on the basis of present case law, the 
article tries to answer a series of questions, to discover the attitude of the CJEU court 
(hereinafter ‘the Court’) and the European Commission (hereinafter ‘the Commission’). 
According to the Court judgments and the Commission decisions in recent cases, how do 
competition authorities treat licensing issues related to FRAND-encumbered SEPS? Which 
Article acts as legal basis? In fact, competition authorities only intervene in very 
exceptional cases—seeking injunctions. Through discussion on seeking injunctions, the 
article analyzes the standpoint of competition authorities and the legal principle applied 
behind the exceptional intervention. Also, the article continues to discuss whether 
competition authorities shall do more than that? Besides, in this part, the potential 
detriment to consumers, problems in transferring FRAND-encumbered SEPs and the 
disputes due to a globalized standard are also discussed as potential reasons for anti-trust 
intervention. 
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Part 5 starts from exploring the relationship between FRAND commitments and 
competition law. In principle, FRAND shall first be discussed between licensing parties. 
No matter licensing parties abide by FRAND or not, competition law only intervenes on 
regular basis and competition rules do not offer special treatment to FRAND commitments. 
Thus the role of competition law is neutral. Competition authorities upon applying 
competition rules have to strike a balance between fundamental IPRs and the freedom of 
competition. The article also discusses the relationship between IP law and competition 
law and emphasizes that the balance shall be made on a case-by-case analysis. 
Finally, part 6 gives a short conclusion on the main ideas of this article. It steps further that 
even with anti-trust intervention, standardization risks cannot be solved perfectly. It 
depends on every participants to function a better and more competitive market and it 
relies on every one to make the society better. 
 
2. Background 
‘Standards are technical specifications describing means of achieving certain beneficial 
features of products and services.’4  Standards such as GSM, GPRS and UMTS in 
telecommunication industry ensure that all cellphones can communicate and they are now 
everywhere in our daily life without being emphasized as a standard but in fact these 
standards have already grown into normal use through standard-compliant products such as 
cellphones. In order to set a standard, a variety of domestic and international entities are 
established as standard-setting organizations (SSOs) to examine and to approve such 
technical specifications until they are widely adopted by the market.5 For example, Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) is a standard set by a SSO called the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and GSM is widely used all over the 
world. 
The process to develop and to implement a technical standard is called standardization. 
‘Standardization is a voluntary cooperation among industry, consumers, public authorities 
                                                        
4 National Research Council (U.S.), Patent challenges for standard-setting in the Global Economy: Lessons 
from information and communication technology (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press 2013) 1. 
5 ibid 1. 
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and other interested parties for the development of technical specifications based on 
consensus.’6 Such process usually sets certain thresholds on products or services to satisfy 
public interests for safety, health and environmental reasons. One of the most important 
objectives of standardization is interoperability, which allows products or services to be 
used on different platforms. The function of interoperability can be seen for instance in 
UMTS standards also known as 3G standards, with which consumers are able to get 
signals to use cellphones to call, to get online and to text messages anytime, anywhere with 
different brands of cellphones. 
Technologies that are chosen to be incorporated into a standard are protected through the 
application as patents and protection can be extended even in the process of application 
before a patent is granted. Usually, a standard contains a lot of patents, among which those 
are indispensable to the standard are standard-essential patents (SEPs). Telecommunication 
SSOs such as International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and ETSI usually requires 
SEP holders to agree on FRAND commitments before incorporated into a particular 
standard. 
 
2.1. Standardization generates Benefits 
Generally speaking, standardization promotes economic efficiency and brings about 
substantial benefits to consumers. As discussed above, the most significant benefit is 
interoperability, which as main objective of standard is particularly essential for 
telecommunication industry. ‘Interoperability leads to increased network effect as 
consumers value the product according to the number of its users.’7 Consumers trust in the 
safety, function and quality of standardized products and services. 
Also, as long as one standard is widely accepted in the market, same SEPs are incorporated 
in all kinds of products and services, which leads to economies of scale, research and 
development (R&D) efficiency, as well as unified platforms to develop new products. Thus, 
                                                        
6  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: Towards an increased contribution from standardisation to innovation in 
Europe, Brussels, COM(2008) 133 final, 2 
7 Chappatte (n 2) 322. 
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costs are lowered and prices are also lowered, especially for standardized products and 
components. 
Moreover, as SSOs choose the best among ex ante dispensable technologies, they are likely 
to establish a much better standard than if different technology holders develop it 
separately. This ‘choose-to-be-better’ process then reduces many troubles and risks for 
consumers. Without standardization, they would have to choose by themselves among 
inter-technology competitions and face the possibilities that the technology they choose 
might be eliminated by competitors or by newer and more advanced substitutes.8 
The another important benefit generated by standardization is the promotion of innovation. 
As the emergence of a new standard usually accompanies an arisen market, deriving from 
which many new technologies, products and services appear. The most obvious example is 
in telecommunication industry, developing from 1G till 4G. During the R&D, knowledge is 
disseminated and technologies are widely spread, which then triggers further innovation. 
‘Dynamic standardization is an important enabler of innovation.’9 
 
2.2. Anti-competitive Risks 
Although in general standardization creates economic efficiency and facilitates innovation, 
the creation of important standards eliminates technology competition and creates entry 
barriers upstream. Once the implementation of a standard becomes substantial, companies 
and consumers will find it extremely hard to switch to other technologies, as they are not 
compatible with currently popular products and services. Therefore, alternative 
technological formats and equivalent and substitutable technologies are excluded. The 
possibility to limit technical development and innovation hence happens, as the whole 
industry is locked in to that particular standard. The lock-in effect is particularly common 
in mobile services in telecommunication industry, for example, since the GSM standard 
first adopted in the early 1990s. 10  Based on first GSM standard, enhanced digital 
technologies (2.5G), UMTS networks (3G), then HSPA and HSPA+ and till more recently 
                                                        
8 ibid 323. 
9 Communication (n 6) 3. 
10 Martin Whitehead and Tom Phillips, ‘European Mobile Industry Observatory’ [2011] GSM Association, 7. 
  
 - 6 - 
LTE network are continuously developed to improve the GSM technology. Data proves 
that ubiquitous availability of mobile services today covers ‘98% geographic and nearly 
100% population in the EEA’.11  
Besides, ‘once a patented technology is incorporated as an essential part of a standard, it is 
not possible to manufacture standard compliant products without infringing the IPR 
covering that technology.’12 Obviously as standards are more and more widely used, 
increased market power are created that the patentee might not have without being 
included in the standards.  
A single cellphone might contain thousands of SEPs that allow the interoperability across 
platforms. Therefore, producing a single cellphone without being licensed might 
potentially infringe thousands patents. Each SEP might generate a dominant position in 
relevant market. Of course, the increased market power or dominant position per se by no 
means raises anti-trust concerns. However, risks come when the standard becomes so 
successful and so widely adopted, everyone uses it; companies invest in products; 
manufactures make chips and etc. Hence, theoretically, the SEPs holders are able to 
manufacture and produce products and services compliant with the standard exclusively 
and are able to charge significantly excessive royalties they could not have without being 
included in the standard. This phenomenon is known as ‘patent hold-up.’13 
To step further, if a combination of multiple complementary SEPs holders set their own 
SEPs separately, the final summation might exceed the rate which would be charged if all 
those SEPs are owned by one participant. The situation develops as the number of 
complementary SEPs holders increase. Hence, an anti-competitive royalty stacking is very 
likely in industries where 1) there are numerous SEPs owned by numerous firms; 2) SEPs 
are perfect complements: a license for one patent has no value unless all other essential 
patents are licensed too; 3) a royalty rate is ‘only make-up’ since the marginal cost of 
licensing per unit produced is zero.14 
                                                        
11 ibid 8. 
12 Chappatte (n 2)325 
13 Jamie Lee, ‘An Un(frand)ly Game: Preventing Patent Hold-Up by Improving Standardization’ [2015] Vol 
10, Issue 2, Journal of Business & Technology Law, 376. 
14 Shapiro, Carl, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ [2001] 
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2.3. FRAND commitment as An Industry Solution 
The existence of patent hold-up and royalty stacking along with other risks raise concerns 
that consumers foreseeing them are worried, hesitated and not willing to make use of the 
standard. FRAND commitment emerges as an industry solution to alleviate such concerns 
and to provide guarantee to downstream participants that SEP owners ‘accept that their 
technology must be available to third parties on FRAND terms’.15 That is to say, SEPs 
holders will at least license the use of patents which are incorporated into a technical 
standard on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis. Hence, FRAND commitments 
provide an assurance to firms that they will be accessible to standards and will be able to 
manufacture products depending on standards, as long as they are willing to pay reasonable 
royalties to SEPs holders. 
From an anti-trust perspective, using FRAND commitments to ensure that essential patents 
will accessible to any potential implementer is clearly elaborated in the Commission’s 
Horizontal Guidelines that FRAND commitment is designed to ‘prevent IPR holders from 
making the implementation of a standard difficult by refusing to license or by requesting 
unfair or unreasonable fees (in other words excessive fees) after the industry has been 
locked-in to the standard or by charging discriminatory royalty fees.’16 Therefore, the 
practical purposes of FRAND can be regarded as first to prevent refusal to supply, second 
to prevent patent hold-up and third to prevent discriminatory royalty. 
Not only the Commission, but also SSOs offer recommendations for SEP holders to license 
on FRAND terms. For example, in ETSI policy, it states in Article 6.1 that ‘[w]hen an 
ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 
is brought to the attention of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request 
the owner to give within three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is 
prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(“FRAND”) terms and conditions under such IPR to at least the following extent: 
                                                                                                                                                                        
In Jaffe, Adam B. et al. Innovation Policy and the Economy I. Cambridge: MIT Press, 125. 
15 Chappatte (n 2) 319. 
16 Guidelines (n 1) para287. 
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 MANUFACTURE, including the right to make or have made customized components 
and subsystems to the licensee’s own design for use in MANUFACTURE; 
 sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so MANUFACTURE; 
 repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT; and 
 use METHODS. 
The above undertaking may be made subject to the condition that those who seek licences 
agree to reciprocate.’17  
Fundamentally, FRAND commitments require an SEP holder to in the first place agree to 
incorporate its technology into a standard voluntarily and meanwhile the SEP holder shall 
understand that once the SEP incorporated into the standard, he or she shall license the SEP 
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to all interested parties, no matter SSO, or 
other participants in the standard or downstream competitors.18 Besides, ‘the FRAND 
obligation normally extends to the return commitment of the SSO/licensor to license back 
to individual patent holders’, and also extends to a reciprocal license for further 
improvements.19 FRAND commitments hold the neutral position as both the SEP holders 
and potential licensees are expected to negotiate in good faith in terms of licensing matters, 
which shall be fair and reasonable enough to reflect the economic value of the SEP. 
Therefore, FRAND commitments are designed to firstly ensure the accessibility of SEPs 
and secondly to reward SEPs holders financially.20 
The benefits of FRAND commitments in the process of standardization thus are quite 
obvious. First of all, the commitment ensures access to the SEPs. Without the commitment, 
SEP holders have no constraints under the policy to license their SEPs out. Although it 
might seem to be a limitation on SEP holders’ right to license, the appropriate concession 
of one party leads to the promotion of the standard attracting more manufactures and more 
consumers. Secondly, as SEP holders would have to license their patents on 
                                                        
17 Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy ‘ETSI Rules of Procedure’ (19 November 2014) 37. 
18 Chappatte (n 2) 327. 
19 Steven Anderman and Hedvig Schmidt, EU Competition law and intellectual property rights – the 
regulation of innovation (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 297. 
20  Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, ‘A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for 
Standard-essential Patents’ [2013] Vol 28, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 1137. 
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non-discriminatory terms, licensees shall not be differed or by no means discriminated, no 
matter licensees are big capitals or small potatoes. Last but not least, commitments are 
helpful to reduce the risks of patent hold-up problem and even the royalty stacking.  
However, the fact that an SEP holder does not agree on FRAND commitments does not 
subsequently exclude the SEP holder from the standard.21 There are a lot of reasons for 
doing do. For example, the particular SEP holder might agree on non-royalty clause; or the 
particular SEP is so essential and unique that no other existing substitutes are available on 
technology market. Therefore, there is no obligation for SEP holders to agree on FRAND 
commitments; there is no obligation for SSOs to verify whether licensing terms of 
participants fulfill the FRAND commitment and there is no obligation that the commitment 
must be made before or after the standard-setting process.22 
The FRAND commitments as an industry solution is merely a start. More complex issues 
come into being as FRAND commitments are in nature contractual terms and the explicit 
meaning of FRAND shall be discussed among licensing parties. Therefore, whether 
FRAND commitments actually function well in solving patent hold-up, royalty stacking 
and other issues are still unknown. 
 
2.4. Scope and Methodology 
First of all, this article intends to mainly focus on telecommunication sector. The 
importance to research in this area lies fundamentally in the fact that in terms of 
technology areas, the majority of disclosed SEPs are found in the field of 
telecommunications via public networks, which accounts for around 76% of the whole 
SEPs disclosed.23 It has been estimated that ‘the GSM standard for 2G mobile telephony 
involved more than 4,000 ‘essential’ patents and the UMTS 3G standard involved more 
                                                        
21 Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, ‘Can Standard-Setting lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View 
on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND’ [June 2007] Vol 3, No I, European 
Competition Journal, 110. 
22 Guidelines (n 1) para288. 
23 ITU Report, ‘Understanding Patents, competition and standardization in an interconnected world’, 1 June 
2014, 52  
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than 8,500 “essential” patents.’24 The huge number of patents implies a huge potential of 
patent disputes. In fact, FRAND-encumbered SEPs are very problematic in 
telecommunication sector. Litigation about SEPs has increased considerably over the last 
thirty years globally, especially litigation about SEPs in telecommunications via public 
networks. There are around 4,284 SEPs, among which 244 SEPs have been litigated and 
this number ranks the highest among other technology area.25 For example, the smart 
phone wars in recent years among Apple, Samsung and Motorola. In fact, there have been 
more than 50 lawsuits between Samsung and Apple in many jurisdictions.26 Till now, in 
EU, FRAND related disputes that caught by anti-trust law concentrate on 
telecommunication sector. 
Second of all, the article lays emphasis on one SSO: European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) and its policy. ETSI alone has set 6505 standards, including 
Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) / General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 
namely ‘2G’, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) namely ‘3G’ and 
Long Term Evolution (LTE) namely ‘4G’ telecommunications standards. For instance, ‘a 
modern laptop computer implements around 251 interoperability standards.’27 ‘The total 
number of SEPs declared to ETSI is 155,474,’ among which 23,500 patents are essential 
patents to GSM or UMTS standards, and which shall all be implemented into smartphones 
or any other devices using these two standards.28 
Thirdly, the article narrows down the scope to SEP licensing issues. The whole process of 
standardization usually goes through three main stages: the product formulation stage, the 
                                                        
24 Anderman and Schmidt (n 19) 293. 
25 ECSIP Report, ‘Patents and Standards, A modern framework for IPR-based standardisation’, Ares [2014] 
917720, 25/03/2014, European Commission, Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, 126. 
26 Damien Geradin, ‘Ten Years of DG Competition Effort to Provide Guidance on the Application of 
Competition Rules to the Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents: Where Do We Stand?’; Paper prepared for 
the Research Roundtable on Innovation and Technology Standards, February 7-8, 2013, Searle Center on 
Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Northwestern University School of Law, 6. 
27 Competition Policy Brief, ‘occasional discussion papers by the Competition Directorate-General of the 
European Commission’ [June 2014] Issue 8, 2. See also Brad Biddle, Andrew White and Sean Woods, How 
Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions) [September 2010], available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619440  
28 ibid 2. See also ETSI’s database, available at http://ipr.etsi.org/.  
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creation of the standard and the selection of essential patents stage, and licensing out 
stage.29 This article will mainly focus on the third stage, namely the licensing out stage of 
standardization. ‘The first stage of a patent or technology pool is often a form of 
preliminary meeting in which actual or potential competitors meet to identify what type of 
product is being aimed at and what types of research activity may be necessary to produce 
the technology to create the product.’30  
After that, in the second standard-setting stage, SSOs normally identify optimal 
technologies that are essential or non-essential to the standard. Before any technologies are 
selected as essential, an obligation to license their technologies on FRAND terms is put 
forward by SSOs to secure the accessibility of users after the standard forms. In this stage, 
it only concerns that participants agree to license on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms, where whoever agrees to commit seems to be licensee-friendly 
and appropriately behaved. In this stage, it is SSOs’ policies that play an important role in 
how selected essential patents holders shall behave. The most serious problem that could 
happen might be the ‘patent ambush’, which means the particular patent while selected to 
be standard essential patent and incorporated to the standard, has never been disclosed to 
other participants, and thus never subject to FRAND commitments, no matter this 
non-disclosure behavior happens intentionally or inadvertently. In addition, as the 
standard-setting process is often achieved by means of standardization agreements between 
participants, such agreements are subject to Article 101 TFEU. It is in the standardization 
agreement that FRAND terms are committed by participants. The EU Commission actually 
offers a Horizontal Guidelines regarding to competition law issues on standardization 
agreement. However in this article, standardization agreements are not focused. 
After all the necessary technologies are chosen, either essential or non-essential, a new 
standard which contains a particular technological specification has been established. The 
SSO and participants would like to license out the technologies to produce products or 
services compliant with the standard. ‘The IPRs in the technology package are usually 
offered as a “one-stop” licence but it is possible to offer different IPRs in different mixes of 
                                                        
29 Anderman and Schmidt (n 19) 293-296. 
30 ibid 293. 
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technology packages for different types of licensees.’31 At the same time, a royalty rate is 
usually required as a reasonable return to SEP and non-SEP holders. Usually, a grant-back 
of improvements terms will also be required, and also possibly a non-royalty term or a 
cross-licensing term. It is in this licensing out stage that anti-trust intervention is necessary, 
when for example, the licensing agreement itself is in violation of Article 101 and for 
example, after achieving the dominant position, failure to offer accessibility to the SEP on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms will potentially violate Article 102. In this 
stage, the disputes of patent ambush might be disclosed as clearly an anti-competitive 
effect which is obvious enough to raise the attention of competition authorities on the 
relevant market. In this stage, problems of breaching FRAND commitments will also pop 
out as usually raised by the party who is charged by SEP holder excessive royalties. 
Therefore, the focus on the third stage leads to more careful and detailed discussion on 
potential anti-trust issues that FRAND-encumbered SEPs might meet with. 
Inspired by Chappatte’s work32 and the reply33, the article makes effort to answer the 
necessity for anti-trust intervention in FRAND-encumbered SEPs issues through empirical 
studies on various practical phenomena and normative sources such as statutory texts and 
regulations, as well as authoritative sources such as case law and scholarly legal writings. 
The answer begins with explanatory approach on existing laws and regulations, as well as 
a thorough study of EU case law and also slightly refers to comparative law perspective. 
 
3. FRAND commitments 
3.1. Contractual Nature  
As has already been introduced in previous discussions, the SEPs holders usually need to 
commit to license their SEPs on FRAND terms, which indicates that they waive the IP 
right to license exclusively under patent law and that they waive ‘the right to refuse to offer 
a licence to those seeking one’, in exchange for ‘the opportunity to have its patented 
                                                        
31 ibid 296. 
32 Chappatte (n 2) 
33 Geradin and Rato (n 3) 
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technology included in a standard’. 34  More specifically, ‘the FRAND commitment 
constitutes a restriction on the IPR holder’s ability to freely set royalties for the use of its 
IPR by third parties.’35 In fact, to commit FRAND terms acts more like a strategy to 
assure implementers the capability to get licensed on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms. Therefore, it constitutes more as a licensing terms as the result 
of negotiations than a licence in itself.  
Basically, to commit on FRAND terms and conditions is a contractual behavior which 
varies among different participants and among different contractual arrangements. The 
nature of FRAND commitments is ‘similar to a standard form contract incorporating a 
number of implied terms.’36 Therefore, it leads to disputes among participants as FRAND 
commitments per se embody a level of vagueness in nature leaving substantial contents to 
negotiations among participants, which then possibly incurs expensive litigation in practice. 
To this extent, FRAND commitments as an industry solution only work quite well in the 
formation and dissemination of a standard, which on the other hands brings about a large 
number of disputes among participants in practicing the standard. 
The contractual nature of FRAND commitments conveys a high degree of freedom either 
in free will to be a SSO member or in free will to commit to license on FRAND terms.37 
SSOs usually burden no obligation to require a SEP holder to first become an SSO member 
and to second bind by FRAND. Therefore, whether a SEP holder joins or not joins in a 
SSO and whether the holder commits or not commits on FRAND terms will only be taken 
into consideration as circumstances for incorporation into a standard. For example, in ETSI 
policy, Section 8 provides for a mechanism to deal with ‘non-availability of licences’.38 
It is this contractual nature of FRAND commitments that leads to further discussion 
questioning the necessity of anti-trust intervention. As a contractual matter, theoretically 
                                                        
34 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 109. 
35 Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Yves Botteman and Agapi Patsa, ‘EU Commission Briefing--The European 
Commission’s New Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines’ [May 2011], available at: 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications.html, 5. 
36 Anderman and Schmidt (n 19) 297 
37 Roger G. Brooks and Damien Geradin, ‘Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment’ 
[July 2010], available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645878, 6. 
38 ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (n 17) 38. 
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FRAND shall be dealt with substantially among participants. However, in exceptional 
circumstances, anti-trust intervention might be required to prevent serious anti-competitive 
effects brought about by the exercise of FRAND-encumbered SEPs holders. The 
vagueness of FRAND indeed gives an ‘excuse’ for SEP holders to act anti-competitively as 
long as they are able to. 
 
3.2. Vagueness of FRAND 
‘While the logic underlying the use of a FRAND commitment appears quite clear, its 
precise content remains obscure.’39 FRAND commitments in the language as ‘fair’, 
‘reasonable’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ have inherent ambiguity. Even the Horizontal 
Guidelines leaves the definition of FRAND untouched, and instead it merely refers ‘fair’ to 
licensing terms, refers ‘reasonable’ to royalties and refers ‘non-discriminatory’ to 
treatments of standard implementers. 
 
3.2.1. Contractual FRAND under ETSI policy 
Following the above discussion, the freedom for parties to negotiate on precise meaning of 
FRAND terms does not mean that parties are able to agree on whatever licensing terms 
they want, because such FRAND terms are already more or less framed by the SSO policy. 
Let’s take ETSI policy as a typical example.  
As stated in ETSI policy objectives that ‘3.2 IPR holders whether members of ETSI and 
their AFFILIATES or third parties, should be adequately and fairly rewarded for the 
use of their IPRs in the implementation of STANDARDS and TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS,’ and ‘3.3 ETSI shall take reasonable measures to ensure, as far as 
possible, that its activities which relate to the preparation, adoption and application of 
STANDARDS and TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, enable STANDARDS and 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS to be available to potential users in accordance with 
the general principles of standardization.’40  
Therefore, a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing term shall at least entail 
                                                        
39 Steptoe & Johnson LLP (n 35) 5. 
40 ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (n 17) 36. 
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firstly an adequate and fair reward for SEP holders’ innovations and secondly availability 
for potential users to participate in the standard.41  
Since the need to define ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ stems from the IP right of SEP owners to 
seek reward for the innovative contribution they have made, therefore, it seems to be 
necessary to take a look at what constitutes a reasonable reward.42 To define a reasonable 
reward is no better than to define a reasonable royalty. One still has to take into 
consideration all sorts of costs including R&D costs, material costs, labor costs and etc. 
Most importantly here is whether such a fair and reasonable reward would include the 
value contributed to the standard-setting process. As the technology will worth more than it 
is after inclusion into a particular standard, does the added value due to the lock-in effect of 
the standard-setting process reflect the intrinsic value of the particular SEP? The 
affirmative answer will indicate a much higher reasonable royalties charged than that in a 
negative answer.  
Although the connotation behind ETSI policy seems to limit the FRAND in some way, in 
fact there still leaves enormous spaces as to how FRAND shall look like. Maybe the only 
possible restraints can be drawn from it might be the ‘adequately reward … is by no means 
a synonym of fair’ and the reward shall be adequate enough ‘to motivate the investment 
and risk necessary to create the next generation of innovation’.43 
In recent years, several efforts have been made within the ETSI to narrow down the almost 
unlimited scope of FRAND and to impose certain restrictions on both licensing parties. For 
instance, there are proposals to prohibit royalty-free cross licences, proposals to contain 
supposed ‘bad practices’, proposals to introduce the principles of aggregated reasonable 
terms and proportionality into the FRAND and etc.44 However, seldom of these proposals 
are accepted and the ETSI emphasizes that ‘specific licensing terms and negotiations are 
commercial issues between the companies and shall not be addressed within ETSI’.45 
 
                                                        
41 Brooks and Geradin (n 37) 12. 
42 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 115. 
43 Brooks and Geradin (n 37) 12. 
44 ibid 20. 
45 ibid 21. See also ETSI ‘Guide on Intellectual Property Rights’ 2007 para4.1. 
  
 - 16 - 
3.2.2. ‘Fair’ and ‘Reasonable’ 
The meaning of ‘fair and ‘reasonable’ raises attention ever since the FRAND commitments 
came into place. Disputes among them have a long history, and even till now scholars also 
have disagreements among each other. What is quite interesting is that ‘[m]ost of the 
literature does not distinguish between “fair” and “reasonable”. The former in fact is a 
unique term only in the EU context, especially EU competition law, while in US the term 
RAND is more often used instead of FRAND with the lack of ‘Fair’ in the beginning.46  
Generally speaking, there are two basic principles to define FRAND deriving from court 
practices. One comes from the US: the Georgia-Pacific method. The other comes from the 
European Commission: comparison approach, for example in Commission’s decision in 
concern with the complaints against Qualcomm.47 As this article focus on European 
competition law, the US Georgia-method will not be mentioned here.48 
In EU law, as stated in Horizontal Guidelines, ‘[i]n case of a dispute, the assessment of 
whether fees charged for access to IPR in the standard-setting context are unfair or 
unreasonable should be based on whether the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the 
economic value of the IPR.’49 This economic value principle has been established in 
United Brands case, in which the Court rules that ‘... charging a price which is excessive 
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied would 
be such an abuse.’50 However the words ‘reasonable economic value’ in themselves bear 
no clear techniques to measure whether a royalty is excessive or not. The ‘economic value’ 
is almost as open as ‘fair and reasonable’.  
There are indeed different benchmarks to measure and to help. In United Brands case, the 
cost-based method is established through a two-stage test that ‘the questions therefore to be 
                                                        
46 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 113. 
47  Layne-Farrar Anne, Padilla A. Jorge and Schmalensee Richard, ‘Pricing Patents for Licensing in 
Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of Frand Commitments’ [2007] 74 Antitrust Law Journal, 
679. 
48 More information on Georgia-Pacific method on Gerogia-Pacific Corp v US Plywood Corp. 318 F Supp 
1116 1120-21 [SDNY 1970]; See also Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, ‘Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking’ [2007] 85 Texas Law Review. 
49 Guidelines (n 1) para289. 
50 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para250. 
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determined are whether the difference between the cost actually incurred and the price 
actually charged is excessive, and, if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, 
whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to 
competing products.’51 Because it is considerably difficult to assess the cost due to the 
rapid development of standard and new generation technologies, the cost-based method is 
not well applied.  
The second benchmark recommended by the Commission is to decide the economic value 
of a technology through comparison. The first possibility is to compare ex ante disclosed 
licensing terms with ex post negotiated licensing terms.52 Another possible comparison 
can be made on the basis of other royalties received by the SEP holder in situations 
equivalent to FRAND commitments, such as royalties that are charged for the same patent 
in other comparable standards; 53  royalties charged for the same patent in a 
non-standardized environment; or royalties imposed in the ‘similar agreements that the 
patentee has entered with companies that are in a similar position as the licensee.’54 A 
third comparative benchmark might be royalties paid for the use of other patents that are 
comparable to the alleged SEP.55 
The third valuation method turns out to be a ‘top down analysis’. This analysis concerns 
with the ‘relative importance of the technology to the standards and the licensee’s 
products’.56 It means that the royalty level shall not only be associated with actual value of 
the patented technology, but also be associated with added value that the SEP adds to the 
whole standard. The Commission confirms this view that ‘in cases where the licensed 
technology relates to an input which is incorporated into a final product it is as a general 
rule not restrictive of competition that royalties are calculated on the basis of the price of 
                                                        
51 ibid para252. 
52 Guidelines (n 1) para290. 
53 ibid para290. 
54 Comments submitted by the German Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (GRUR) 
concerning the Commission’s Public Consultation on ‘Patents and Standards – A modern framework for 
standardisation involving IPR’, [January 2015], available at: 
http://www.grur.org/uploads/tx_gstatement/2015-01-27_GRUR_Proposal_Consultation_on_Patents_and_Sta
ndards.pdf, 22. 
55 ibid 23. See also Microsoft Corporation v. Motorola, Inc., 10-CV-01823-ORD (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 
2013). 
56 ibid 18. 
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the final product, provided that it incorporates the licensed technology’.57 Therefore, it is 
the value of the particular SEP in the final products that plays an important role here. In 
case of a patent portfolio, importance of portfolio as a whole to the standard shall be 
emphasized. ‘This method – as is the case for most other valuation methods – is fact 
intensive and the assessment eventually depends on a number of individual factors and on 
the evidence offered by the parties to support their theories.’58 
The fourth available benchmark is a ‘bottom up analysis’, where this hypothetical analysis 
depends considerably on the incremental value of the technology over the best alternative 
that was available at the standard-setting stage.59  Another ex ante assessment is to 
compare the royalties charged before the industry locked into the particular standard and 
the royalties charged after the lock-in.60 This approach has been approved reasonable in 
the Apple v. Motorola case decided in US. However, in EU due to the lack of case law, 
neither the Court nor the Commission has made a clear confirmation or guidance on this 
method, the Commission only states in the Horizontal Guidelines that this approach 
requires that the comparison shall be made in a consistent and reliable manner.61 
The above list of possible benchmarks to determine a ‘fair and reasonable’ royalty is a 
non-exhaustive one. The determination entails a fact intensive inquiry which is influenced 
by a number of factors in real life situations. For example, those who contributes to a large 
percentage of patents or SEPs in a standard may argue for quantity or pricing matters. 
Therefore, the criterion for fair and reasonable royalties shall vary according to actual 
conditions on a case-by-case basis ‘by reference to concrete objective and subjective 
circumstances’.62 Licensing parties during the negotiation process can also use these 
possible benchmarks for reference in deciding a fair and reasonable royalty, as it might be 
possible for them to perceive in advance how competition authorities may treat such issues. 
 
                                                        
57 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the EU Treaty to Technology 
Transfer Agreements (2014/C 89/03), para184; see also see also: Microsoft Corporation v. Motorola, Inc. (n 
55) para104. 
58 GRUR Comments (n 54) 19. 
59 ibid 20. 
60 Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2012), para913 
61 Guidelines (n 1) para289. 
62 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 113. 
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3.2.3. ‘Non-discriminatory’ 
Compared with fair and reasonable debates on royalties, non-discriminatory requirement is 
not a key topic, even though it is almost as unclear as the definition for ‘fair’ and 
‘reasonable’. The requirements for non-discriminatory in FRAND commitments 
theoretically discussed in this part are basically divided into two categories. The first 
category is a prohibition on price discrimination. The other is to ensure non-discriminatory 
licensing terms. The former is a more direct prohibition that also is regulated in 
competition rules, while the latter conveys vague information that needs further discussion. 
 
3.2.3.1. Price Discrimination 
One important component of non-discriminatory requirement is the prevention of price 
discrimination, namely to prevent discriminatory royalties. How a non-discriminatory 
royalty shall look like is not guided in Horizontal Guidelines, and ‘SSOs seldom clarify 
what licensing structures would be non-discriminatory, not do we know of useful legal 
holdings on this specific questions.’63 The only competition provision that potentially 
deals with price discrimination lies in Article 102(c) TFEU: ‘applying dissimilar conditions 
to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage.’ This definition is extended by the Court to ‘the application of similar 
conditions to different transaction.’64 According to this provision, a discriminatory royalty 
might be understood as applying different levels of royalties to licensing parties of 
equivalent conditions and applying same level of royalties to licensing parties of dissimilar 
conditions.  
In order to enforce this non-discriminatory requirement for royalties, there are more 
complex and difficult concepts that need to be clarified. The first difficulty is to define 
different levels of royalties. Is it a price discrimination when ‘royalties assessed as a 
percentage of the licensee’s revenues discriminate against licensees who sell more 
                                                        
63 Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro, and Theresa Sullivan, ‘Standard Setting, Patents and Hold-Up’ 
[May 2007] No.3, 74 Antitrust Law Journal, 638. 
64 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics OUP2012 
294/para4.455. See also Case 13/63 Italian Republic v. Commission [1963] ECR 165 in the context of the 
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expensive products’?65 Is it a price discrimination when SEP holders sets ‘a price per unit 
which varies with the number of units the customer buys’?66 A second difficulty is what 
are concrete definitions of licensing parties of equivalent conditions and those of dissimilar 
conditions. Is it a price discrimination when SEP holders charge different royalties to 
different licensing parties depending on their ability to provide products or depending on 
geographical factors? Again, despite of all these complex questions, there is at least one 
thing that reaches consensus that any decision shall be made on a case-by-case analysis, 
which requires competition authorities to look into concrete legal and factual conditions. 
Despite a quite problematic definition of non-discriminatory royalty, it shall be at first 
confirmed that a non-discriminatory requirement for royalties is necessary. The necessity 
lies pretty much in the possibility that royalties charged by SEP holders might be 
superficially fair and reasonable, but indeed discriminatory among various standard 
implementers. For instances, a SEP holder might charge royalties depending on the 
productivity ability of standard implementer, which is the ability to produce products. 
However, it might be very likely that a big company which has more efficient productivity 
might eventually produce comparable products to a small company. In this case, the 
different royalties charged are indeed quite discriminatory.  
Also, in the situation of a successful standard, where SEP holders hold initiative and the 
indispensability of the SEP entitles the holders the ability to price discriminate. Such 
discrimination might deter potential implementers, slow down the dissemination of the 
standard and finally pass detriments to consumers. 
 
3.2.3.2. Non-discriminatory Terms 
Non-discriminatory requirements are not only about monetary elements, but also include 
non-discriminatory licensing terms. The non-discriminatory element requires SEP holders 
to license their patents to licensees of equivalent conditions on similar terms. One question 
thus may be put forward whether such terms really impose any obligations on contractual 
parties, especially any obligation under Article 102 TFEU, because cases if confronted by 
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the Court or the Commission are going to be examined in the same manner in 
circumstances either with or without non-discriminatory requirement. Does this 
requirement conveys more than just duplication of European competition law? 
The answer is affirmative. Although in Article 102 TFEU, it states that ‘(c) applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage’, the particular IP owner still has the exclusive right to 
refuse to license the patent to some else. To this extent, ‘such law may indeed permit 
outright discrimination in certain circumstances’, as a result of the exclusive intellectual 
property rights.67 However, as discussed in previous paragraphs, in the situation of a 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs, there exist a premise that SEP holders waive the right to 
license exclusively and agrees to license to whoever are willing to offer FRAND royalties. 
As the SEP holder almost agrees to license the patent on an every-one basis, 
non-discriminatory requirement becomes prevalent and substantial. Licensing terms shall 
be offered regardless of licensees who are either big companies or small ones; who are 
either willing to grant back improvements or not and who are going to compete with the 
SEP holder on the same market or not. 
Even though non-discriminatory term becomes substantial, it does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that licensing terms and conditions shall always be the same regardless of 
different contractual arrangements. The licensing agreements still can be differed in 
different circumstances. For instance, SEP holders themselves might have entirely different 
interests. A SEP holder who only focuses in upstream market, namely the technology 
market, whose remuneration might depends entirely or at least substantially on the 
licensing royalties, will probably want to seek maximum amount of revenues and rewards. 
In other situations, a vertically-integrated SEP holder who not only is interested in 
developing technologies but also in manufacturing products on the basis of the 
technologies compliant with the standard, would probably like to drive competitors out of 
the downstream market and try not to license his SEPs to other manufactures.68 It is also 
very likely that a vertically-integrated SEP holder might seek to cross license with pure 
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upstream SEP holders. To cross license with party A, not with party B,can hardly violates 
non-discriminatory requirement. 
Now that the non-discriminatory requirement genuinely is capable of putting some 
obligations on SEP holders, another question now is put forward how exactly a SEP holder 
is able to ensure that the particular SEP is accessible to all third parties in a 
non-discriminatory way.69 The definition for ‘discrimination’ shall be elaborated not only 
as applying dissimilar condition to equivalent situations, but also as applying equivalent 
condition to dissimilar situations. Following from this thread, it now becomes really 
complicated to decide whether conditions are similar or dissimilar and whether the 
licensing terms are applied in a similar way or in a dissimilar way. Moreover, other factors 
such as market share and the input of standard implementers who might also be a SEP 
holder in the same standard, shall also be taken into consideration, but what confuses is 
how important these factors really are.  
However despite these possible clearance, there are still questions here, for example, under 
non-discriminatory requirement, can SEP holders offer different licensing terms to 
different implementers? For instance, a SEP holder might require unremunerated 
grant-backs against licensees who holds many patents and consequently deters innovation 
or refuse to provide reciprocal licences to rival manufacturers in the downstream market 
and so on. All these problems need further guidelines by competition authorities and on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
3.2.4. Other licensing terms 
Usually in a licensing agreement, except for royalty issues, there are other licensing terms 
negotiated between two parties, which are also needed to be examined under FRAND 
commitments in order to ensure the accessibility to the standard. ‘This may include beyond 
the relevant market norms for royalties, also customary practices relating to non-monetary 
terms such as field of use of the license, provisions regarding the sub-licensability, 
reciprocity, grant-backs, defensive suspension, confidentiality and other common patent 
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licensing considerations.’70 
In fact, such terms are not uncommon in licensing agreements of FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs. For example, many SSO policies allow SEP holders to circumvent their FRAND 
commitments on cross-licensing provision. Such arrangement bears a clear intention for 
the further development and innovation of the technology and the standard, which are more 
common in small standardization bodies especially when their standards are not widely 
spread and not successful enough facing with competing standards. Indeed, the 
cross-licensing term is a fundamental requirement in the formation of a patent pool, where 
at least two patent owners agree to cross-license their patents for a particular technology or 
for a particular feature. As the IP owners have the freedom to enter into a particular 
standard or not, their willingness to agree on cross-licensing terms relies simply upon 
themselves. The only thing needs to be taken care of is whether such cross-licensing terms 
are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Especially the least non-discriminatory 
requirement shall be satisfied. 
All these other terms will potentially raise debates whether they are in consistent with 
FRAND commitments or not, but most importantly every case shall be examined 
depending on the specific legal and factual circumstances as licensing scenarios can be 
extremely different and complex. 
 
3.2.5. SSOs and SSO policies 
While admitting the contractual nature of FRAND commitments and admitting that the 
precise meaning of FRAND terms shall first be dealt with among licensing parties, the role 
of SSOs and the role of SSO policies shall not be ignored. Generally speaking, SSO 
policies require SEP holders to disclose their patents and to make commitment to all 
potential implementers to license the technologies on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory basis. A quest for balance exists as the premise before SSOs make their 
IPR policies. ‘A well-balanced IPR policy is likely to attract all types of stakeholders to the 
standardization process. However, if the IPR policy overly favours patent holders, then the 
standard may not meet users’ needs, and not be readily implementable. Similarly, if the IPR 
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policy overly favours users, then patent holders may decide not to contribute their 
technology to the standardization process,’ said by Malcolm Johnson, Director of ITU’s 
Telecommunication Standardization Bureau.71 
Apparently, the disclosure requirement and the FRAND commitment requirement are the 
fruits of such balance, especially in large standardization bodies where thousands of SEPs 
would be included in a single standard. In telecommunications and related industries, a 
majority of SSOs allow FRAND licensing commitments before the incorporation of 
particular SEPs, including ETSI, ITU, IEEE and etc.72 
Although the FRAND commitment is proposed by SSOs and illustrated in SSO policies as 
one of the two building blocks of their IPR policy (apparently the other one is disclosure of 
patents), SSOs usually do not give explicit meaning of FRAND in writings and only use 
the words ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ to cover everything. Therefore, the 
vagueness of FRAND actually roots here in SSO policies. It is quite understandable why 
SSOs are fairly reluctant to give explicit meaning of FRAND, because the licensing per se 
is already a pricing behavior and any form of ex ante negotiations inside SSOs is strictly 
scrutinized by competition authorities. In avoidance of anti-trust intervention, SSOs act 
carefully under the nose of competition authorities. ‘For most SSOs, however, the 
minimum goal of their IPR policies is to ensure that all essential patent claims are 
reasonably known to the participants and are available for licensing under a FRAND or a 
similar framework minimizing the potential for ex post hold-up and royalty stacking.’73 
They bear no further responsibility to guarantee a fulfillment of FRAND commitments, 
and instead participants have to make decisions by themselves whether they will charge 
royalties on FRAND basis.74 
Consequently, SSOs usually do not play a role in the enforcement of FRAND 
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commitments, which are and shall be left to licensing parties to negotiate. In the case of 
disputes, they may resort to a court or submit to arbitration. 
 
3.2.6. Clarify FRAND? 
It is undeniable that the vagueness of FRAND commitments brings about problematic 
issues. Is it really necessary to clarify vague FRAND as proposed by some SSO 
participants?  
To clarify vague FRAND theoretically has some obvious benefits. First of all, a clearer 
FRAND with better a better shared understanding will enable both implementers and SEP 
holders to evaluate licensing agreements with lower costs and in shorter time. Secondly, 
SEP holders might not charge too much, which is especially important for smaller and 
medium-sized implementers who are incapable of having enough information or resources 
to decide the proper royalties. Thirdly, on the other hand, royalties will not be too low, 
when the buyer power is much larger. Fourthly, such a clarification will potentially reduce 
the number of disputes when licensing parties are unable to reach agreement on what 
FRAND exactly means. Even when the disputes are forward to the Court and the 
Commission, it will be easier for judges and competition authorities to evaluate the 
licensing agreement on the compatibility with FRAND. Therefore, in reaching a licensing 
agreement, transaction costs and negotiation costs are reduces, and the whole licensing 
process is mitigated as well as reduction in litigation. 
However, the clarification of FRAND commitments not just generates some benefits. 
There are also some serious disadvantages that might be result in by this clarification. 
Firstly, any attempt to clarify the meaning of FRAND might trigger more complex 
discussions and disagreements on applicable principles and the explicit meaning of 
FRAND in practice. Such discussion could be made in legal context or in economic 
context. No matter what theories are going to be applied to explain FRAND, it will always 
be extremely hard to reach consensus. Moreover, no matter how FRAND terms are 
clarified, there will always be specific cases or exceptional circumstances where such 
clarification will not apply. ‘A “one-size-fits-all” is just not possible!’ It can be imagined 
that a stricter interpretation will undermine the basic function of FRAND where FRAND is 
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inapplicable in many situations and will underestimate the unpredictable future markets. A 
less strict interpretation has almost the same effect as no interpretation at all.75 
Therefore, the vagueness of FRAND commitments is indeed favourable. ‘Despite the 
widespread use of FRAND in the IPR policies of a significant number of major SSOs, 
virtually no such policies define the FRAND commitment as specifying or dictating a 
particular licensing result.’76 Literatures more or less mention that FRAND is unclear and 
bears no concrete meaning. This cannot be viewed as ‘a shortcoming of SSOs IP policies’. 
On the contrary, it is the vagueness of FRAND that ‘ensure[s] the widest availability of the 
technology embodied in the standard in the widest possible variety of circumstances.’77 As 
discussed previously, FRAND commitments are de facto restraints on SEP holders 
licensing rights. A well-defined or very precise FRAND leaves too few spaces for the 
flexibility of licensing out technologies. When the FRAND commitments somehow shape 
the fairness of a royalty such as a number of proportion, the so-called ‘fairness’ is very 
likely to fall into a formal fairness instead of a substantive fairness. To such extent, the 
vagueness of FRAND commitment shall be viewed as a basic line for the protection of 
SEP holders patent right, as well as for the contractual freedom enjoyed by both parties of 
the licensing agreements. Before the anti-trust intervention, both parties are entitled to 
negotiate and discuss about the precise meaning of FRAND terms based on different 
contractual arrangements, no matter before or after signing the licensing agreement. 
 
4. Intervention or not? 
The main objectives of FRAND commitment are to ‘prevent IPR holders from making the 
implementation of a standard difficult by refusing to license or by requesting unfair or 
unreasonable fees (in other words excessive fees) after the industry has been lock-in to the 
standard or by charging discriminatory royalty fees.’ 78  However, do FRAND 
commitments function perfectly as they are expected to? If the answer is negative, then 
how to remedy the failures: contractual remedies or competition rules? Most importantly, 
                                                        
75 ECSIP Report (n 25) 188. 
76 Chappatte (n 2) 328. 
77 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 112. 
78 Guidelines (n 1) para287. 
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is anti-trust intervention justified? 
 
4.1. Legal Framework in EU 
Apparently, as FRAND commitments have a contractual nature, the most explicit way to 
deal with disputes on FRAND terms is contract law. Both parties can negotiate on FRAND 
terms either before, during and after the reach of licensing agreements. In the case of 
disputes, parties can also go to arbitration or go to the court to seek for damages based on 
the claims of breach of contract. 
The second legal basis that might be relevant is the IP right of SEP holders, as SEP 
basically is a patent which entitles the holder a patent right since the right is granted and 
the right will last as long as the patent is valid. IP rights are fundamental rights protected in 
the Article 17(2) of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(hereinafter ‘the Charter’), which grant the SEP holders exclusive rights to take advantage 
of their own patents. However, IP rights are regional, which could be either national, 
European or international and which depend on the application of particular patents. This 
characteristic of a patent right often results in a question of the validity of a particular 
patent such as whether a European patent is valid for example in Asian countries.  
Besides, FRAND commitment as a contractual matter does not mean that SEP holders and 
standard implementers can reach whatever agreements they want or do whatever they like 
arbitrarily on the market if they occupy a dominant position. Indeed, anti-trust law might 
intervene when standardization generates anti-competitive effects. The condition is very 
much possible when the standard becomes so successful that the exercise of exclusive 
rights of SEP holders creates barriers to entry, controls the product market and service 
market and behaves abusively such as holding up licensees and charging excessive 
royalties. Under such circumstances, both Article 101 and 102 might be invoked as legal 
basis for problems regarding FRAND-encumbered SEPs. However, occupying a dominant 
position held by a SEP holder does not necessarily indicate a violation of competition rules. 
More efforts shall be made to examine carefully the anti-competitive effect and the 
possibility to restrict, prevent and distort competition. Therefore, a detailed and thorough 
examination of both factual and legal conditions shall be carried out under competition 
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rules. As standardization discussed in above paragraphs usually involves elimination of 
inter-technology competition, exchange of information and so on, Article 101 is also very 
likely to be infringed unless four conditions in Article 101(3) are satisfied and thus 
exempted. 
After a standard has been set and SEPs have been incorporated into a particular standard, 
the licensing out stage allows SEP holders to license their SEPs. The licensing agreements 
of SEPs are assessed, which are required by both the Horizontal Guidelines and SSO 
policies to commit to be in accordance with FRAND terms. As SEPs holders are already 
required to license their essential patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, 
an attempt to impose licensing conditions incompatible with FRAND in the licensing 
agreement, has the possibility to construct a violation under Article 101(1). If Article 101(1) 
is violated and the conditions for Article 101(3) are not satisfied, the licensing agreements 
might be declared void; fines might be imposed and damages might be claimed. Basically, 
the four requirements in order for Article 101(3) to be satisfied are efficiency gains, 
indispensability, pass-on to consumers and elimination of competition. 
In accordance with the exemption of Article 101(3), the technology transfer block 
exemption regulation (hereinafter ‘TTBER’) may also apply according to newly revised 
TTBER 2014. The regulation provides a safe harbour for technology transfer agreements. 
The technology transfer agreements in the context concern with ‘the licensing of 
technology rights where the licensor permits the licensee to exploit the licensed technology 
rights for the production of goods or services.’79 Also, within the meaning of safe harbour, 
block exemption applies to technology transfer agreements to the extent that they are 
caught by Article 101(1) but fulfill the four conditions laid down in Article 101(3). 
Therefore, TTBER is a specific regulation that targets agreements for the transfer of 
technology.80 The Commission also offers guidelines to technology transfer agreements 
(hereinafter ‘TTA Guidelines’). The TTA Guidelines offers detailed information on the 
application of TTBER and application of Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) of the treaty 
outside the scope of the TTBER.  
                                                        
79 TTA Guidelines (n 57) para1. 
80 ibid para44. 
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As to the nullity effect in Article 101(2), there is also a problem in application of this 
provision especially when the standard after implemented has been widely used for many 
years. The standard might have already developed several generations and becomes 
indispensable to the relevant market, despite which there is no substitute comparable to the 
standard. Moreover, participants might have already invested millions even billions of 
euros to develop the standard. To declare a standardization agreement void turns out to be 
ineffective. In such circumstances, a better way to remedy is to enforce the FRAND terms 
committed by SEP holders.  
Except for Article 101, Article 102 TFEU can also be invoked as legal basis of disputes 
about FRAND-encumbered SEPs. Indeed, Article 102 has been raised more often under 
which FRAND related cases have been brought about to the Court and to the Commission 
in the past several years. Cases such as Huawei v ZTE case81, Motorola decision82 and 
Samsung decision83 by the Commission, are dealt with under Article 102.  
The mere existence of dominant position does not in itself leads to the application of this 
article, there must exist abusive conducts through a careful examination of anti-competitive 
effects. Dominance contributed to the success and lock-in effect of the standardization, can 
only be treated as a prerequisite for anti-trust intervention, but it does place special 
responsibilities on dominant firms not to engage in any other abusive exclusionary or 
exploitative behaviors. In order for Article 102 to intervene, first of all the SEP holders as a 
member of a SSO shall agree to license their patents on FRAND terms as stated in SSO 
policy; second of all the SEP holder shall occupy a dominant position on relevant market 
and thirdly the abusive behavior has to certain extent anti-competitive effect so that 
excessive royalties are able to be charged or disadvantageous licensing terms are able to be 
imposed constituting a breach of FRAND commitment.  
In practice, competition authorities are quite reluctant to use Article 101 and Article 102 to 
exercise anti-trust intervention, which can be proved from very limited cases established. 
 
                                                        
81 Case C‑170/13 Huawei v ZTE [2015] OJ C 215 
82 Case AT.39985—Motorola—Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents [2014] OJ C 344/6 
83 Case AT.39939—Samsung—Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents [2014] OJ C 350/8 
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4.2. Under provisions 
4.2.1. Contractual remedies enough? 
As FRAND commitments are in nature contractual arrangement, one strategy for a licensee 
to seek to enforce FRAND terms is to assert a breach of contract claim against the SEP 
holder. There is one case Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Mobility Inc. that Microsoft seeks 
for contract damages for Motorola’s breach of FRAND licensing commitments on the 
factual basis that Motorola charges 2.25% royalties for certain Motorola’s SEP products, 
including Xbox.84 
However, claiming for contractual remedies might be a possible solution to enforce 
FRAND commitments and to get fair royalties for SEPs, but the difficulty embedded in 
quantifying and proving damages prevent this from becoming a mainstream way to claim 
remedies.85 Moreover, the remedy for the breach of contract is merely a compensation for 
damages expected from the breach. ‘Those damages are likely to be insufficient to 
compensate accused infringers and society at large for the losses they will suffer if they are 
enjoined from using standards once though open to all.’86 Therefore, breach of contract 
claim is a tool, but not strong enough to address relevant damages that caused not only to 
the licensing parties, but also to the freedom of competition on the relevant market. 
 
4.2.2. Violate FRAND equates violate competition law? 
The first question proposed here is whether competition law, namely Article 101 and 
Article 102 TFEU in their provisions indicatively requires FRAND commitments? In other 
words, is FRAND embedded inherently in competition rules, so that any violation of 
FRAND commitment tacitly violates competition rules, namely Article 101 and Article 102, 
either both or separately?  
 
                                                        
84 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20359 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2012) 
85 Lindsey Martinez and Timothy J. Toohey, ‘Standard-Essential Patents And FRAND: Complex Interplay’ 
[November 2012] Law 360, available at: 
http://www.swlaw.com/assets/pdf/news/2012/11/06/StandardEssentialPatentsAndFRANDComplexInterplay_
MartinezToohey.pdf  
86 Mark A. Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations’ [December 2002] Vol 
90, Issue 6, Article 3, California Law Review, 1925. 
  
 - 31 - 
4.2.2.1. Article 101 
As to this question, Chappatte asserts in his work that a SEP holder who ‘seeks to impose 
terms on licensees that are not consistent with its FRAND commitment, all the parties to 
the standard will potentially be in breach of Article 81(1) EC’, which is now Article 101(1) 
TFEU, unless Article 101(3) is satisfied.87 Following that thread, in order to meet the 
conditions of exemption, the licensing agreement 1) must not impose restrictions that are 
not indispensable; 2) must pass on a fair share of the resulting benefits to consumers; 3) 
must not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the products; and 4) must 
license on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.88 
The assertion is strongly opposed by Geradin and Rato, as stated in the reply that several 
reasons are given against the assertion. Firstly, ‘the Commission does not consider that 
standards have either as their object or their effect to restrict competition.’ The reply cites 
Horizontal Guidelines and argues that only where participation in standard-setting is 
unrestricted and transparent, where the agreement sets no obligation to comply with the 
standard and where standardization procedures are non-discriminatory, open and 
transparent, standardization agreement does not restrict competition.89 After that, the reply 
continues to argue that the Commission views the restriction of competition in 
standardization agreements on ‘the extent to which the parties remain free to develop 
alternative standards or products that do not comply with the agreed standard.’90 In 
addition, only when a specific licensing agreement created by joint dominance which leads 
to a de facto industry standard, Article 101 may require access to the standard on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.91  
Before any discussion is provided, there is one mostly important point worth mentioning 
that what Chappatte and the opponents disagree with each other is basically standardization 
                                                        
87 Chappatte (n 2) 332. 
88 Article 101 of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
C 326 
89 Geradin and Rato (n 3) 164. 
90 Commission Notice - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C 3, para167. 
91 Geradin and Rato (n 3) 166. 
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agreements, which ‘have as their primary objective the definition of technical or quality 
requirements with which current or future products, production processes, services or 
methods may comply’.92 
After identifying the object as standardization agreements, the argumentations in reply are 
logically convincing. However, despite all these Commission’s documentations, the 
competition law rarely intervenes in practice on the basis of Article 101, which seems to be 
inapplicable at all. Competition authorities while considering with applying competition 
rules to standardization agreements, always take into account the significant positive 
economic effeciency created by standardization, which then seems to increase values for 
consumers and brings benefits to consumers. In addition, the standardization agreements 
are signed in the standard-setting stage, which is the second stage of standardization, when 
the standards are unknown whether they will be successful and popular in the future or not. 
At this point, standardization agreements are very unlikely to be caught under Article 101 
because such standards might be a complete failure and the cost to carry out a competition 
investigation is really high. Moreover, when the anti-competitive effect of particular 
standard occurs, the standard has already been so popular and so successful that it becomes 
indispensable in relevant market, every product is compliant with the standard and some 
participants have already invested millions even billions to develop improvements. To 
declare a standardization agreement void is really not a good choice. When facing with 
anti-competitive effect created by refusal to license, patent hold-up or excessive royalties, 
Article 102 might apply as well as contractual remedies in breach of FRAND.  
According to the reply, it seems really reasonable that Article 101 does not require FRAND 
commitment. However, if in practice this Article will never act as legal basis for disputes to 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs, then the whole arguments here are meaningless. 
 
Apply A101 on SEP licensing agreements 
In spite of standardization agreement, the SEP licensing agreements are potentially caught 
by Article 101 if such agreements are anti-competitive enough to raise competition 
                                                        
92 Guidelines (n 1) para257. 
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concerns. Since the SEP holders have agreed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms, 
consequently those SEP holders should have kept their promises and the licensing 
agreements should by no means be unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory. However, this 
is not always the case. That’s why the Court has to deal with Huawei v ZTE case and the 
Commission has to cope with Motorola and Samsung decisions. It is because the FRAND 
commitments do not prevent perfectly licensing parties from fixing price, controlling 
outputs or sharing markets where Article 101 might intervene if the SEP licensing 
agreements ‘may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, 
and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any 
other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, 
or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’93  
However, such intervention might be exempted if the conditions in Article 101(3) are 
satisfied. First of all, the licensing agreements shall give rise to efficiency gains, which are 
often satisfied due to the fact that SEP licensing agreements diffuse SEPs and the standard, 
which promote technical interoperability and compatibility, but again to what extent 
licensing agreements increase innovation shall be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 
Secondly, licensing agreements shall not ‘impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives.’94 Thirdly, 
such agreements shall allow consumers a fair share of benefits. ‘Efficiency gains attained 
by indispensable restrictions must be passed on to consumers to an extent that outweighs 
the restrictive effects on competition’ caused by the licensing agreements.95 Finally, there 
shall be no elimination of competition. 
                                                        
93 Article 101 TFEU (n 88) 
94 Article 101(3) TFEU (n 88) 
95 Guidelines (n 1) para321. 
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In accordance with the above analysis, technology transfer agreements which cover 
agreements for the transfer of technology may be exempted if they fall into the ‘safe 
harbour’ established under TTBER. However in order to fall under TTBER, there is a 
premise that such technology transfer agreements shall first be caught by Article 101(1), 
and then it might be exempted based on several conditions. In addition, TTBER may not 
be applicable if the network of such agreements falls out of the market share thresholds; if 
such agreements are concerned with hardcore restrictions and etc.96 A FRAND technology 
transfer agreement does not prohibit the agreement from falling under Article 101(1), 
neither do FRAND commitments have influence on market share or give chance for the 
agreement not to be concerned with hardcore restrictions if it is indeed price fixing or 
output limitation. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that no matter a particular SEP has declared 
FRAND commitments or not, the conditions for anti-trust intervention are the same. In 
other words, a FRAND-encumbered SEP and a non FRAND-encumbered SEP share the 
same requirements to fall within of Article 101, the same requirements to be exempted 
under Article 101(3) and the same requirements to fall into safe harbor. FRAND 
commitments do not give any prerogative to a particular SEP and alleged licensing 
agreement. Therefore, in order for anti-trust intervention, FRAND commitments offer no 
haven for SEP licensing agreements. A FRAND-encumbered SEP licensing agreement 
shall be treated just like any other licensing agreements. 
As to the question whether a SEP licensing agreement that is inconsistent with FRAND 
potentially violates Article 101, the answer is that such agreements do not necessarily 
violate Article 101 and the agreements have to be assessed on legal and factual conditions. 
The most obvious example is charging excessive royalties, which is a core prohibition of 
FRAND commitments and which is not per se prohibited under Article 101. Therefore, a 
licensing agreement to charge excessive royalties might not necessarily violates Article 101. 
Indeed, FRAND commitments and Article 101 have no inherent connection. Whether a 
                                                        
96 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L 93, 
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SEP licensing agreement compliant with FRAND commitment or not, neither adds 
anti-competitive effect to the agreement nor alleviate the situation. Therefore, Article 101 
does not requires FRAND licensing. However, the situation under Article 101 is quite 
different from that under Article 102, while the latter shall be examined in a more careful 
way and FRAND commitments add some restrictions on licensing parties as established by 
EU case law. 
 
4.2.2.2. Article 102 
Chappatte also asserts that Article 102 requires FRAND licensing.97 Article 102 applies 
with a prerequisite of dominant position held by an SEP holder or manufacture or other 
participants in the relevant market. The competition rule does not intervene unless a 
unilateral abusive behavior happens taking advantage of the dominant position. The 
requirement for FRAND licensing can be perceived from the plain language of this Article. 
Article 102 as written in TFEU has already involves essential factors of FRAND: ‘directly 
or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’ 
and ‘applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage’98 The former is apparently a similar 
requirement for ‘fair and reasonable’ trading or selling prices, while the latter requirement 
is similar to ‘non-discriminatory’.  
Except that, other restrictions carried out by Article 102 are also somehow similarly stated 
in FRAND commitments. For example, exclusivity provisions such as margin squeeze 
which intend to drive competitors out of the market are also not compliant with FRAND 
requirements.  
However, the reply again opposes that ‘the giving of a FRAND commitment does not alter 
the analysis required under Article 82 EC (now Article 102) before it can be concluded that 
the terms under which IPR is licensed are abusive.’99 If a FRAND commitment simply 
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repeats the words and the requirements in Article 102, then there is no need at all to have 
this licensing term because in any case the conduct of a dominant firm will be examined 
under this Article. If otherwise the FRAND contains more and stricter requirement than 
Article 102, then there is no space for this Article 102 to play a role and the simple 
application of FRAND is fairly enough. However, it is unknown yet how FRAND shall be 
defined and what kinds of obligations FRAND actually has brought to both licensing 
parties. 
At the time, Geradin and Rato wrote the reply, the Huawei v ZTE case has not yet been 
decided by the Court and the Commission has not given the Motorola decision and the 
Samsung decision. Therefore, it is impossible for both scholars to estimate that both the 
Court and the Commission approaches this question in a comparatively aggressive way in 
exceptional circumstances that they treat the behavior of seeking injunctions 
anti-competitive in FRAND-encumbered SEPs. But again, this is only in exceptional 
circumstances where FRAND commitments exist and only for the behavior of seeking 
injunctions, not any other exploitative or exclusionary behaviors. However, in situation of 
Article 102 TFEU, it is more likely that charging excessive royalties, holding up patents 
and refusing to license will raise the attention of competition authorities, as they open 
investigations on Qualcomm100 and the Commission decides on Rambus case101. As 
practically exists, it is very likely that Article 102 TFEU shall intervene in 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
Despite all the arguments above, requirement for anti-trust intervention in 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs should not be understood as, to comply with competition law 
means to comply with FRAND commitments, or the other way around. Instead, practical 
legal and factual situations shall always be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, whether in 
particular case the standardization agreement or licensing agreement although committed 
FRAND violates Article 101; Or whether an abusive behavior by a SEP holder in dominant 
position in breach of FRAND commitment violates Article 102; Or whether such behavior 
                                                        
100 Press release: Antitrust: Commission opens two formal investigations against chipset supplier Qualcomm, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5383_en.htm  
101 Case COMP/38.636 – Rambus [2009] OJ C 30. 
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not in breach of FRAND commitment still is so anti-competitive that it might possibly 
violates Article 102. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine conditions in detail where FRAND commitment fails 
to function as expected in Horizontal Guidelines and SSOs policies, and whether such 
conditions need competition law intervention as well as how competition authorities deal 
with or not deal with them in practice. 
 
4.3. Perceived Problems 
4.3.1. Refuse to commit and Deceptive: Patent Ambush 
As discussed previously, SEP owners have a complete freedom to decide whether they will 
promise to license on FRAND terms or not. Such a decision usually will influence the 
standard-setting stage considerably, because due to the unwillingness of a SEP holder, the 
SSO will then have to try to find alternatives or try to remove the specific features 
demanding the particular SEP.102 In real world, there are plenty of reasons why SEP 
holders would refuse to commit on FRAND terms. For instance, a patent might be 
incorporated into a standard without substitutes at the time of standard-setting. Due to the 
fact that it is the only choice for SSOs to develop a particular standard, the SEP holder 
might have no willingness to commit on FRAND terms. Therefore, refusing to commit 
leads to the consequence that a SEP is not bound by FRAND. 
Another possible situation where the SEP holder with his SEP incorporated into the 
standard does not commit on FRAND terms through an improper way, is patent ambush. 
Patent ambush occurs ‘where an IPR owner willfully and knowingly fails to meet its duty 
to disclose to a SSO ownership of IPR which are subsequently incorporated in the standard 
under adoption.’103 In fact the core problem in patent ambush is non-disclosure before and 
during the standard-setting stage. The reason why FRAND is relevant lies in the fact that 
while these SEPs are not disclosed ex ante, they do not commit to FRAND either, which 
they usually should have if disclosed. A situation like this shall be differed from those SEP 
owners whose technologies are nevertheless incorporated into the standard and who refuse 
                                                        
102 ITU Report (n 23) 88. 
103 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 159. 
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to license on FRAND terms.  
Although in both conditions FRAND terms are not committed by SEP owners which might 
lead to a seemingly identical legal consequence, however, a refuse to commit and a 
deceptive not to commit shall be treated in different manners if the conduct of a SEP holder 
who occupies dominant position is abusive enough to raise anti-trust concerns. The 
difference lies fundamentally in the word ‘agreement’, no matter the standardization 
agreement that forms the standard or the licensing agreement between SEP holders and 
standard implementers. The agreement is a contract, and there are legal instruments to 
determine what a contract means. ‘Both the Civil Law and Common Law traditions of 
contract interpretation and enforcement fundamentally look to discern and give effect to 
the intent of the parties.’104 In other words, what really matters is parties’ intention to 
reach agreement. The fact that SEP holders develop and agree on the specific SSO policy 
which requires its members to commit on FRAND terms indicates a willingness of SEP 
holders to be bound by FRAND and its willingness to license to third parties on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Such good-faith willingness shall by no means 
be undermined by deceptive non-disclosure. 
Therefore, in the case of refusing to commit, the SEP holders upon joining the standard 
express the unwillingness to be bound by FRAND, and that particular holder will still be 
able to exercise the exclusive IPR embedded in the patent which means that the holder is 
able to refuse to license in certain conditions even though the third party is willing to pay a 
reasonable royalty. However, the situation of patent ambush or other deceptive conduct is 
totally different, because at the very beginning where the standardization agreement is 
going to be negotiated, the SEP holder has not expressed his intention in a good faith. 
While the particular SEP holder hides the real intention to ‘cheat’, other parties still expect 
a FRAND licensing from him. Therefore, already in the standardization agreement, the 
non-disclosure party bears a responsibility in the deception. Taking advantage of the 
deceptive conduct, the SEP holder is capable of exercising abusively on the market. When 
such abusive exercise raises anti-trust concerns, the original deception in the 
                                                        
104 Brooks and Geradin (n 37) 8. See also Arthur L. Corbin and Joseph M. Perillo and John E. Murray, 
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standardization agreement shall also be taken into consideration in the final judgment. 
 
4.3.2. Patent Thicket 
It is known to all, in order to implement a standard, a manufacture for example, has to be 
licensed on all SEPs for the normal functioning of a standard, and this is exactly why those 
patents are called standard essential patents. The condition where the manufacture has to 
licensing deals for all SEPs from every SEP holder is ‘patent thicket’.105 There flows 
naturally a problem regarding those SEP licensing that not all SEP holders have agreed to 
commit on FRAND terms. 
The problem of patent thicket, according to Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, derives 
from the tragedy of anti-commons when ‘multiple owners share the rights to property but 
every one of them has the right to exclude all others’ and ‘the tragedy occurs from 
under-use’.106 In other words, all the SEP holders’ patents together form a standard. Any 
single participant, no matter how small the contribution to the standard may be, has the 
capability to block the whole implementation of the standard. Hence in order to implement 
the standard, all the SEPs have to be licensed and each SEP holder has to waive exclusive 
licensing rights to license the particular SEP to any third party. Patent thicket is thus an 
extension form of ‘the application of the anti-commons theory to high technology 
industries involved in standard setting’.107 
The risks of patent thicket can be reduced if SEP holders all agree on FRAND 
commitments in the standard-setting stage. The commitments would require SEP holders to 
license their SEP in a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory way, which seems to 
potentially address the problem in a perfect way as all SEP holders have to license out their 
patents. However, the reality often tells a different story. There indeed exists many 
problems even though SSOs generally require a FRAND commitment from any 
technologies which might be incorporated into the standard. 
First of all, the SEP holder might not be willing to commit on FRAND terms especially 
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when there is no alternative and comparable technology on the technology market at the 
time of standard-setting. However, in order to function the standard, SSOs have to 
incorporate the technology into the standard. Hereby without a FRAND commitment, SEP 
holders are not restrained by contract law. Patent law on the other hands gives the 
exclusivity right of the SEP owner to possibly extract excessive royalties and impose 
discriminatory terms. Under such circumstances, without the intervention of competition 
rules, SEP holders will be able to lead to significant anti-competitive effects on the relevant 
market. 
Moreover, even with FRAND commitment, the risks of patent thicket are not perfectly 
prevented. The most typical example happens when the SEP holder is also a manufacture 
in the downstream market. As a vertically-integrated company, the SEP holder might take 
advantage of negotiation time in reaching the licensing agreement. The company may on 
one hand try to postpone the reach of licensing agreement and expand the timing of 
licensing negotiations in order to win the first chance to occupy the market. What the SEP 
does is by no means a breach of FRAND commitment, but merely a delay in reaching the 
licensing agreement, and such delay is used more like a business strategy to occupy the 
market.  
Patent thicket is merely a phenomenon that acts as the basis for further abusive conducts, 
such as patent hold-up and royalty stacking. The inherent problematic nature of patent 
thicket in standardization to certain degree determines afore that FRAND commitments are 
not enough to address relevant standardization risks, but still it is necessary to look into 
more specific type of problems, to see how FRAND works to prevent such problems and to 
find out whether FRAND alone is enough. 
 
4.3.3. Patent Hold-up 
As explained previously, after the inclusion of a SEP into a standard with the whole 
industry locked into the standard, company who ‘thereby control the product or service 
market to which the standard relates’, is able to act anti-competitively ‘by “holding-up” 
users after the adoption of the standard either by refusing to license the necessary IPR or 
by extracting excess rents by way of excessive royalty fees thereby preventing effective 
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access to the standard.’108  
It is necessary to look into Philippe Chappatte’s theory for hold-up problem and royalty 
stacking, as well as Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato’s reply to it. Philippe Chappatte 
illustrates the hold-up problem and royalty stacking, and proposes FRAND commitments 
as industry solution. Later on, his theory is rebutted by Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato 
to show that the need for anti-trust intervention claimed by Philippe Chappatte is 
superficial. In following paragraphs, both of their arguments are discussed, based on which 
extended analyses are addressed intend to show that there is a need for anti-trust law to 
intervene in the situation where SEP holders committed to license their patents on FRAND 
terms. 
According to Philippe Chappatte’s theory, the hold-up problem is based on a SEP holder’s 
ability to first ‘block companies from producing any products compliant with the standard’ 
and second ‘demand royalties for its patent that are significantly higher than the royalties it 
could have demanded had the technology not been included in the standard, or before the 
standard was adopted and competition eliminated.’109 The situation is especially severe 
with mobile telecoms standards.110  
The idea in a whole is rebutted by Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, due to several 
reasons. First of all, they think Philippe Chappatte’s hold-up theory purely conceptual and 
rarely happens. The hold-up theory is established on the premise that there are ‘sufficiently 
close alternative technologies existed at the time of adoption of a particular standard, and 
that standardization eliminated inter-technology competition.’111  However, in fact, in 
absent of evidence showing actual alternatives, ‘the technology in question faced no 
competition either before or after standard adoption’ and standardization only enlarged 
rewards.112 
The reason proposed makes sense, but the conclusion is hardly convincing. First of all, in 
absent of sound evidence showing ‘actual alternatives’ at the adoption of a standard, it is 
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hard to say whether the SEP holder faces competition or not before the adoption. 
Furthermore, without standardization or at least the success of a standard, the SEP owner if 
developing and marketing his products by himself, could never reached the success and the 
network effect as a standard does. Standards, for example GSM and UMTS in 
telecommunication industry, are de facto globally dominant. Such a dominant position of a 
SEP not only gives the owner the power to charge excessive royalties on European markets, 
but also on the market of other countries, for example China. Relevant cases have already 
happened as a sound reality proof to warn companies and consumers of hold-up problem. 
For instance, on March 2th 2015, China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) in its investigation into Qualcomm Incorporated finds that Qualcomm taking 
advantage of dominant position in technology market in terms of possessing SEPs of 
CDMA, WCDMA and LTE standards, is able to charge unfairly excessive royalties for 
chip sales and thus abuse its dominant position in violation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law 
(‘AML’).113 Thus, it is very likely that the hold-up problem is just not revealed by the 
Court and the Commission or at least not severe enough to reveal, instead of the perception 
that there is no such problem at all. 
Secondly, Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato refute Philippe Chappatte’s theory that 
hold-up theory ‘assumes that licensing terms were unknown and unavailable prior to 
standardisation’ and that implementers are lock-in due to significant technology-specific 
investment. The argument disapproves on one hand that in fear of the ex post hold-up 
problem, manufactures could ‘pursue pre-standardisation licences systematically’ and be 
careful of those who refused to enter into ex ante negotiations. On the other hand, because 
lock in effect works ‘long after an SSO adopts a standard’, the implementers actually have 
enough time to consider licensing terms. Under unfair and unreasonable terms and 
conditions, both SSOs and implementers could ‘(i) modify the standard to exclude that 
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essential IP; (ii) implement another standard; (iii)challenge the licensing terms.114  
The argument in itself has no flaws, but the actual situations have to be differed. At the first 
two stages of standardization, when the final standard has not been decided, both parties 
could freely negotiate licensing terms and all other aspects. However, after the final 
standard has been formed and FRAND commitments have been made by SEP holders, 
hold-up problem still could happen due to the inherent vagueness of ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ 
terms and even due to the breach of FRAND commitments. The situation is especially 
likely to happen when the standard through long time practicing becomes successful and 
popular in the whole world. Under such circumstances, the standard has already been 
indispensable, which cannot be modified in any way or replaced by another standard. A 
manufacture later want to produce the products that are compliant with the standard might 
be hold-up, because SEP holders charge excessive royalties in breach of commitments.  
After that, the reply argues that firms who gain market power because of standardization 
also face dynamic constraints. The most obvious one is that because the particular SEP will 
continue to depend on the SSO for its position as the standard evolves, participants in 
SSOs have the chance to ‘punish’ SEP holders by excluding them from future generations 
of the standard or in other unrelated standards.115 In the situation of breaching FRAND 
commitment, the particular SEP holder should have already realized this consequence as 
the exercise of excessive royalty actually takes place. The fact that SEP holder while 
realizing the possible ‘punishment’, still decides to charge excessive royalties leads to 
rethinking the motivation behind such abusive exploitation. It might be possible that the 
particular SEP holder does not want to participate in further standards at all. It might also 
be possible that the particular SEP holder holds a very strong bargaining power that he 
does not afraid of the punishment. For example, there are companies which do not touch 
upon downstream product market and only focus on upstream technology market. The 
business strategy of part of such companies is to buy selected patents from others and thus 
develops newest and most advanced technologies. Such strategy could be so successful 
that SSOs are unable to circumvent their technologies to develop a new standard. 
                                                        
114 Geradin and Rato (n 3) 135. 
115 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 148. 
  
 - 44 - 
In short, it is undeniable that the possibility for the occurrence of patent hold-up problem is 
exceptionally low. There are only limited cases for reference. However, once it happens, 
the anti-competitive effect it incurred to the relevant market and the damages it caused to 
consumers and companies are immeasurable. The figure of the profits a SEP holder could 
earn due to excessive royalties are millions, even billions. This is exactly why such 
situation needs to be taken care of attentively. Besides, possible patent-hold problems are 
not perfectly prevented by FRAND commitments. The amount of excessive royalties the 
SEP holder is able to extract in breach of FRAND is numerous. Consequently, compared 
with limited remedies as the consequence of breach of contract, the anti-competitive effect 
that patent hold-up is able to bring to the relevant market will be enlarged due to the 
amplification effect of huge amount of euros.  
Without a threat of anti-trust intervention, such anti-competitive effect on the market could 
in extreme circumstances destroys a product market. However, upon applying competition 
rules to hold-up problems, it is unnecessary for competition rules to be applied 
well-rounded. Competition authorities have to very careful about the anti-competitive 
effect on the market. They should instead of a mere suspect have sound evidence to prove 
that such anti-competitive effect is de facto as a result of patent hold-up. They would have 
to balance the possible detriment to the standard, to innovation and to consumers as a 
consequence of anti-trust intervention. This is a practical issue faced with by competition 
authorities and this may be why they are reluctant to touch upon patent hold-up problems. 
 
4.3.4. Royalty Stacking 
The situation of royalty stacking in the first impression is fairly easy to understand. A 
particular product in order to compliant with a particular standard has to get license from 
all indispensable SEPs that are necessary to implement the particular standard. Royalty 
stacking happens when each of the SEP is licensed within ‘reasonable’ term but ‘stacking 
up so many reasonable terms would indeed lead to an unreasonable sum.’116 The royalty 
stacking problem is perceived as highly possible in telecommunication sector where ‘(i) 
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essential patents are “perfect complements”; (ii) there are a large number of essential 
patents owned by a large number of firms; and (iii) a royalty rate is “only make-up” since 
the marginal cost of licensing per unit produced is zero.’117 
This assertion is again opposed in the reply. The reply argues that the uncertainty on 
‘reasonable’ royalties in question already makes the royalty stacking problematic. In 
addition, to test the reasonable level of a royalty, ‘an extensive empirical analysis of the 
relative costs, properly defined and calculated, of the different inputs comprising such 
product, including the cost of the R&D incurred to create the incorporated IPR, 
manufacturing costs, marketing costs, etc.’118 After that, Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato 
give three examples to prove that ‘cross-licensing between essential patent holders 
significantly dampens the risk of royalty stacking,’119 when deals are made among SEP 
holders themselves. 
The above arguments are convincing in limited geographical areas such as US and EU, 
where SEP holders are de facto players on the downstream product market and where it is 
necessary for contractual parties to cross-licensing. The premise of the argument is that 
deals are made between SEP holders. However, in a third country, this is not the case. 
Instead, deals are often made between SEP holder and a pure implementer, where 
contractual parties do not agree on cross-licensing terms. On the other hand, if such 
argument is true in US or EU, then it can be concluded that the product providers are 
mainly SEP holders themselves. It seems to be a game within the standard where no third 
party is willing to muscle in the market where the third party is in such disadvantageous 
position that he will be charged so high royalties and will be squeezed out of the market 
easily. In such circumstance, the SEP holders are very likely just to gather together and 
form a collective dominance. FRAND if also agreed by all SEP holders is also a mere 
scrap of paper, because regardless of royalty levels, SEP holders are able to exercise all 
kinds of abusive conducts to drive the third party out of the market.  
Therefore, the potential risks caused by the royalty stacking can by no means be ignored as 
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the effect it has to the market could be significantly anti-competitive. In perception only, 
SSOs might be able to help reduce the risks of royalty stacking. A royalty shall be fair and 
reasonable in aggregate -- that is, ‘the sum of royalties collected for all SEPs covering a 
given standard should not be so high as to remove the incentives to make and sell products 
using the standard, or, where such costs are passed on to the consumers, to undermine the 
desirability of the market for standardized end-products.’120 SSOs who have detailed 
information about the number of SEPs incorporated in the standard and who can decide the 
incorporation based on several factors including FRAND commitments, shall do more than 
just leave the risks of royalty stacking alone. For instance, SSOs could at least state in IPR 
policies that the aggregate royalties shall also be FRAND. 
Again, royalty stacking is a perceived problem discussed in the context which in practice at 
least in EU jurisdiction has never been touched upon by the Court or the Commission. The 
litigation costs asserted by the reply indicate an even smaller possibility for anti-trust 
intervention, because ‘royalty stacking is not common enough and costly enough in the 
real world to warrant the kind of pervasive regulation.’121 It is extremely hard to prove that 
an aggregate royalty is excessive and has anti-competitive effect on the market and on the 
adoption and dissemination of a standard that detriments competition. Therefore, the issue 
of royalty stacking is purely theoretical and even more abstract than the theory of patent 
hold-up.  
 
4.4. Case Law: Seeking Injunctions 
Injunctions are usually ordered by national courts as a remedy to deter any act of 
infringement of IP rights enjoyed by right holders. The right of IP owners to seek 
injunctive relief is expressly guaranteed under IP Enforcement Directive stating that 
‘Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an 
infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the 
infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement.’122 Such 
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injunction can be ‘a precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the 
alleged infringer,’ as an interlocutory injunction for imminent infringement and in the case 
of a likelihood to endanger the recovery of damages, as well as permanent as a result of the 
decision on the merits by a court.123  
However, in present case, an injunction sought by SEP holders for FRAND-committed IP 
is very controversial. When a SEP holder commit to license the technology on FRAND 
terms, it usually assures that the particular SEP is accessible to whoever implements the 
standard and at the same time is willing to enter into licensing agreements with the SEP 
holder on FRAND terms. However, with the ability to seek or threaten to seek injunctions, 
the SEP holders are able to exclude certain implementers from using their SEPs. The right 
to seek injunctions thus potentially raise anti-trust concerns. In the very beginning, one 
question has been proposed as several scholars argue that ‘by making a FRAND 
commitment an essential patent holder waives its right to seek injunctions in case of 
infringement (the “waiver theory”).’124 If this is the case, then whoever would like to use 
the SEP and related products and services, can just go ahead and use without paying a 
royalty to obtain a licence. According to the reply, this is because SEP holders who commit 
FRAND licensing implicitly waive their rights to seek injunctions. Then the only relief 
there is an ex post damage claim, which also seems to be the worst situation for unlicensed 
users. Then ‘patentees would arguably prefer to settle for a licence on terms that would not 
provide a fair return on their investment, in other words terms which would not comply 
with FRAND, rather than face lengthy, onerous and uncertain court proceedings for the 
award of damages.’125 Besides, the most apparent shortcoming of the ‘waiver theory’ is 
the fact that it lacks any kinds of statutory or provisional legal basis either in laws and 
regulations or in SSOs policies. 
Now SEP holders who committed FRAND licensing can also seek for injunctive relief 
against any act of infringement on their IP rights, which by no means makes the licensing 
issue simple and convenient. Instead, it is SEP holders right to seek injunctions that makes 
the anti-trust intervention necessary and complementary to FRAND commitments. 
                                                        
123 ibid Article 9. 
124 Geradin and Rato [2007] (n 21) 117. 
125 ibid 119. 
  
 - 48 - 
Cases decided by the Commission and the Court regarding injunctions could be viewed as 
the solid evidence that anti-trust intervention is necessary where SEP holders acting 
abusively due to the lock-in effect of the successful standard, even though they have 
committed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms. The most important cases are Huawei v 
ZTE, and more recently the Motorola decision and the Samsung decision. These three cases 
show a clear picture how the Commission and the Court treats injunction issues. 
 
4.4.1. Huawei v. ZTE 
On March 2013, the Dusseldorf Regional Court referred to the CJEU five questions about 
remedies available to SEP holders: the Huawei v ZTE case.  
In this case, the Court establishes that an injunction sought by an SEP holders, who offers 
to license the particular SEP on FRAND terms, does not constitute an abuse of dominant 
position within Article 102, as long as: ‘prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, 
first, alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that 
patent and specifying the way in which it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the 
alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on 
FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such 
terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated, and 
where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer has 
not diligently responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices 
in the field and in good faith, this being a matter which must be established on the basis of 
objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.’126 
The first and the most important question put before the Court is that ‘does the proprietor 
of [an SEP] which informs a standardization body that it is willing to grant any third party 
a licence on [FRAND] terms abuse its dominant market position if it brings an action for 
an injunction against a patent infringer even though the infringer has declared that it is 
willing to negotiate concerning such a licence?’127 ‘There is no previous jurisprudence of 
the EU courts which specifically considers whether such conduct may constitute an abuse 
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of a dominant position.’128  
Upon giving guidelines to relevant issues, the Court first derives from settled case-law that 
the right to seek injunctions as an exercise of an exclusive patent right for normal IP 
holders, itself, will not constitute an abuse of dominant position. However, considering the 
exceptional circumstances of a standard essential patent the holder of which can ‘prevent 
products manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the market’, and of 
a FRAND commitment which ‘creates legitimate expectations on the part of third parties 
that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms’, a refusal to license 
the particular SEP thereby, ‘in principle, constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article 
102’.129 But still, specific legal and factual conditions shall be taken into account. 
Firstly, it can be drawn from this conclusion that the Court upon identifying an abuse of 
dominant position lays emphasis on the exclusionary nature of seeking injunctions, rather 
than exploitative one. In this case, theoretically, in order to examine under Article 102, the 
Court could either concern the exploitative nature for SEP holders to seek injunctions or 
threaten to seek as a method to extract unfair and unreasonable royalties or to impose 
discriminatory licensing terms, or concern exclusionary nature that the behavior to seek for 
injunctions excludes actual or potential competitors from the relevant market and that ‘the 
practices that cause consumers harm through their impact on competition.’130 The Court in 
this case neither takes the position to examine whether the royalties charged by SEP 
holders are reasonable or excessive or the purchase or selling prices imposed actually on 
consumers are fair or reasonable(Article 102(a)), nor tries to involve in the examination of 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties(Article 
102(c)). Instead, as clearly stated in the judgement, the nature of essentiality of an SEP 
renders its use indispensable to all competitors, due to which the proprietor could exclude 
any actual or potential competitors from the market and probably becomes a de facto 
monopoly. Indeed, such an injunctive form of patent hold-up might inevitably undermines 
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the effective access to the standard and the exclusion of competitors on the market 
obviously hampers and eliminates competition, which is not only detrimental to the 
competition on secondary or downstream market, but also finally passes on to consumers. 
Secondly, the Court admits national courts’ position to grant injunctions in the protection 
of patents as exclusive rights. On this premise, the Court settles that ‘the exercise of an 
exclusive right linked to an intellectual-property right by the proprietor may, in exceptional 
circumstances, involve abusive conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU.’ 131 
Therefore, apparently the Court differs the situation of FRAND-encumbered SEPs with 
those that are not FRAND-encumbered ones. The former category is regarded as 
exceptional cases and thus shall be treated in an exceptional way. Such difference lies 
fundamentally in the FRAND commitments per se, as FRAND implies a waiver of 
exclusive licensing rights. Now that part of the exclusive IPR has been waived by the 
parties themselves, the right basis for the national courts to grant injunctions lacks here.  
After establishing a principle regarding to current issue, the court then lays down 
conditions in which seeking an injunction or seeking the recall of products by SEP holders 
who commit FRAND terms, does not constitute an abuse of dominant position, if the SEP 
holder before seeking the injunction must firstly ‘alert it to the fact in writing, giving 
reasons, and specifying the SEP concerned and the way in which it has been infringed’, 
‘unless it is established that the alleged infringer is fully aware of the infringement’132; and 
secondly ‘in any event, present to the alleged infringer a written offer for a licence on 
FRAND terms that contains all the terms normally included in a licence in the sector in 
question, in particular the precise amount of the royalty and the way in which that amount 
is calculated.’133 
Comparatively speaking, potential licensees also bear certain responsibility that the 
infringer shall be ‘able’ to ‘conclude and comply with a licensing agreement on FRAND 
terms and, in particular, to pay an appropriate royalty.’134 The potential licensee ‘must 
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respond in a diligent and serious manner to the offer made by the SEP-holder.’135 In the 
situation where the potential licensee does not accept that offer, ‘it must promptly submit 
to the SEP-holder, in writing, a reasonable counter-offer relating to the clauses with which 
it disagrees.’136 In addition, both ‘[t]he time frame for the exchange of offers and 
counter-offers and the duration of the negotiations must be assessed in the light of 
“commercial window of opportunity” available to the SEP-holder for securing a return on 
its patent in the sector in question.’137 Therefore, ‘[i]f the potential licensee is already 
using the teaching of an SEP without paying for it, the negotiations have to be opened and 
concluded quickly.138  
Although the opinion of Advocate General offers quite detailed procedures to both 
licensing parties, there are still some ‘stumbling blocks’ which have neither been addressed 
by the Court, nor by the Advocate General. For example, is it possible for the Court or the 
Commission to fix or adjust FRAND commitments? If the answer confirms, then to what 
extent can the competition authority adjudicate the FRAND commitments or even gives a 
slightly clear definition to it. Will the question result in different conclusion if the situation 
is an entire patent portfolio? What about a world-wide license? 
 
4.4.2. Motorola and Samsung 
After the Huawei v ZTE case, the most recent Commission decisions – Motorola and 
Samsung, based on the court’s judgement, develops and furthers the basic principles set in 
the Huawei v ZTE case, and illustrates more detailed and practical guidelines about seeking 
injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEP holders.  
The Motorola case at first follows the basic deduction of the CJEU court and finds that 
Motorola infringes Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement by seeking and 
enforcing injunction against Apple on FRAND-encumbered GPRS SEPs. It further 
establishes that ‘the agreement of a potential licensee to a judicial setting of a FRAND rate 
in case of dispute is a clear indication of its willingness to enter into a licence agreement 
                                                        
135 ibid para88. 
136 ibid para88. 
137 ibid para89. 
138 GRUR Comments (n 54) 27. 
  
 - 52 - 
and to pay adequate compensation to the SEP.’139  
On the same day April 29th 2014, in another decision, European Commission makes a 
preliminary conclusion that ‘Samsung has abused its dominant position by seeking 
preliminary and permanent injunctions against Apple on the basis of its UMTS SEPs’140 
under Article 102 TFEU. The seeking of injunctions per se is not an abuse of dominant 
position, however in this case where Samsung committed to license SEPs on FRAND 
terms, ‘the seeking of preliminary and permanent injunctions against Apple was capable of: 
(i) excluding Apple, a rival manufacturer of UMTS-compliant mobile devices from the 
market; and (ii) inducing Apple to accept disadvantageous licensing terms...’141 As to the 
potential objective justification for Samsung’s seeking for injunctions, the Commission 
rejects Samsung’s justification that Apple is unwilling to enter into a licence agreement for 
Samsung’s UMTS SEPs on FRAND terms, while still taking into account the protection of 
Samsung’s IPR, the public interest in maintaining effective competition, the rights linked 
to intellectual property and etc.  
It can be drawn from the two decisions that the Commission fundamentally relies on the 
CJEU previous case law to treat seeking for injunction of FRAND-encumbered SEPs 
anti-competitive in principle, through careful analyses of the dominant position of the 
alleged injunction seekers, namely Motorola and Samsung along with their SEPs, the 
anti-competitive effect in the course and various objective justification.  
In addition, in both cases the importance of potential licensees is emphasized as a factual 
factor to be taken into considerations. The willingness and behavior of potential licensees 
are as important as the standard-setting context and the SEP owners’ FRAND 
commitments. For example, in Motorola decision ‘[t]he corollary of a patent holder 
committing, in the standardisation context, to license its SEPs on FRAND terms and 
conditions is that a potential licensee should not be unwilling to enter into a licensing 
agreement on FRAND terms and conditions for the SEPs in question.’142 Similarly in 
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Samsung decision, the exactly same words are repeated in the context143, which indeed is a 
central focus of the Commission’s preliminary assessment in this case. The emphasis on 
potential licensees indicates that the Commission tries to find a balance between SEP 
holders and potential standard implementers. ‘Finding this reasonable balance means that 
the SEP holder and the potential licensee should be equally incentivized to engage in good 
faith negotiations.’144 If either side of the balance outweighs the other side, it is thus very 
possible that the risks of litigation increase. 
However, with regard to the decisions there are some differences between them, as the 
Motorola decision establishes an infringement under Article 102 but the Samsung decision 
does not. Moreover, in Motorola decision, the Commission emphasizes again a ‘safe 
habour’ for licensees who willing to submit the disputes to the court and to pay the royalty 
accordingly. Hence if parties are not willing to fall into the ‘safe habour’, seeking for 
injunctions thus justified. In Samsung case, the Commission goes deeper to cite three 
scenarios with regard to situations where a SEP holder is entitled to seek preliminary and 
permanent injunctions against a potential licensee, if ‘a potential licensee is in financial 
distress and unable to pay its debts’; if ‘a potential licensee’s assets are located in 
jurisdictions that do not provide for adequate means of enforcement of damages’; if ‘a 
potential licensee is unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms and 
conditions, with the result that the SEP holder will not receive FRAND compensation the 
use of its SEPs’.145 Besides, the Commission continues to establish a detailed licensing 
framework providing that a negotiation period shall amount up to twelve month and if the 
negotiation fails, a third party determination of FRAND commitments either by a court if 
chosen by one party, or by arbitration if both parties agree. These more concrete terms 
render commitments legally binding.  
Both decisions provide clarifications and guidance for all participants in the 
standardization with competition law limits to injunctions of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
Therefore, it is important for national courts to reconsider the grant of injunctive relief, 
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because such behavior is treated as anti-competitive and national courts have to examine 
circumspectly on ‘safe harbour’, anti-competitive effects and etc. 
 
4.4.3. Anti-trust intervention in Injunction cases 
All three cases in seeking injunctions are treated as an abuse of dominant position under 
Article 102 in exceptional circumstances--FRAND commitments. With regard to the 
Court’s and Commission’s practices, some common ideas can be drawn from these cases to 
see how Article 102 of EU competition law works to remedy the injunctive form of patent 
hold-up. 
It is the uniqueness of standardization, FRAND commitments and IP rights that make the 
anti-trust intervention necessary. Standardization firstly will potentially lead to a monopoly 
or quasi-monopoly status of the particular SEP on the relevant market when the standard 
becomes popular and widely used. Then FRAND commitment improves the success of the 
standard through attracting more users into the standard because the commitment offers the 
users accessibility to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, which 
finally realizes the status. Moreover, the SEP holder’s IP rights give the holder the chance 
to explore the rights exclusively, in these cases the seeking injunctions. These three 
elements together endow the possibility for SEP holders to hold up licensees in seeking or 
threatening to seek injunctions. So far, the requirements for anti-trust intervention based on 
Article 102 are all potentially satisfied. Hereby, EU competition law keeps an eye on it.  
It makes sense that the Court and the Commission treat the seeking for injunction in cases 
involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs as anti-competitive. Most importantly, the principle 
set in the exceptional circumstances avoids Type 2 error while not resulting in a more 
excessive risk of Type 1 error. Type 1 error, a false positive, basically allows 
anti-competitive effect, condemns aggressive litigation and encourages potential 
pro-competitive behaviors; while Type 2 error, a false negative, rejects potential 
anti-competitive effect through aggressive litigation, but still allows anti-competitive 
conduct to escape in certain exceptional cases.  
Firstly, it is over-optimistic to assume that seeking injunctions as an option will not 
‘necessarily subject implementers to hold-up, since they would always retain the right to 
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seek a FRAND licence and to seek judicial relief if they believe the licensor is breaching 
commitment.’146 As discussed previously, to seek for injunctions and to threaten to seek 
for injunction potentially hold up licensees especially when the SEP holder is in dominant 
position and has considerable bargaining power to require unreasonable royalties and other 
discriminatory terms or terms more favourable to the SEP holder.  
Secondly, the denial of SEP holder’s right to seek injunctions against licensees who are 
willing to enter into licensing agreements on FRAND terms, neither harms the freedom to 
contract, nor impedes innovation or incentives to invest, let alone detriment to competition.  
Moreover, balancing the anti-competitive effect of Type 1 error and Type 2 error, Type 1 
error is more likely to incur incredible detriment to competition as well as damages to 
consumers. As SEP holders are already dominant on upstream market, if they are no longer 
bind by FRAND commitments as expected and on contrary are able to hold-up users 
downstream, they might become monopoly in the upstream market as well as in the 
downstream market. It can be imagined how detrimental it is to competition if there is only 
one brand of cellphone on the market. In fact, both the Court and the Commission have 
realized the ‘importance of acting rapidly under Article 102 in growing markets’, and ‘even 
temporary exclusion from fast moving technology markets can cause serious harm’.147 
However, if SEP holders are deprived of the capability to seek for injunction under all 
kinds of conditions, their bargaining power might on the other hand be reduced, and 
consequently they are under-compensated. In such cases, a ‘reverse hold up’ problem 
happens if seeking for injunctions is completely banned no matter what negotiations are 
going on between licensors and licencees.148  
Therefore, facing the Type 2 error as well as ‘reverse hold up’ problem, the Court and the 
Commission are able to set several rules to correct this type of error. For example, in 
Huawei v ZTE case the Court states that if potential licensee continues to behave 
unreasonably and refuse to enter into licensing agreement on FRAND terms, seeking for 
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injunction could be justified based on the facts. Also, the ‘safe habour’ established in 
Motorola decision has the same function and in Samsung decision the Commission gives 
several scenarios where seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions are justified, such 
as incapability to pay debts, unwillingness to license on FRAND terms and etc.149 All 
these words amount to precedents established by the Court and the Commission and thus 
provide guidance for any party related. 
Furthermore, with regard to the intervention of competition law, there apparently exists a 
balancing between the applicable fundamental rights and the freedom of competition. The 
Court in the Huawei v ZTE case ‘strikes a balance between maintaining free competition 
and the requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual-property rights and its right 
to effective judicial position,’150 which also happens in later two decisions. Especially in 
Motorola decision, the Commission states in detail the balancing issues. On one side of the 
steelyard, there are fundamental rights protected by the Charter consist of the rights linked 
to IP (Article 17(2)), the right of access to a tribunal (Article 47) and the freedom to 
conduct a business (Article 16), and in the case are these three fundamental rights of SEP 
holders. On the other side, there are restriction prohibited on the legal basis of Article 102 
TFEU, corresponding to an objective of general interest pursued by the Union to establish 
an internal market, for instance the objective to establish a system ‘ensuring that 
competition is not distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings 
and consumers.’151 However, such kind of restrictions shall not ‘involve a disproportionate 
and intolerable interference’ that infringes the very substance of SEP holders’ fundamental 
rights.152 In other words, such restrictions are imposed only on particular SEP related, 
particular product and geographical market related and particular damages related as 
appropriate remuneration for the use of particular SEP. In addition, there are also 
restrictions imposed on SEP holders to protect the rights and freedoms of others. For 
example, in Motorola decision, the SEP owners’ right to seek injunctions actually restricts 
downstream user, Apple’s freedom to enter into agreement of disadvantageous licensing 
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terms, which then considerably impedes competition and finally all those disadvantages 
will be passed on to consumers resulting in reduction of consumer welfare. Therefore, the 
balance between fundamental rights and freedoms is prominently essential for competition 
authorities to consider seriously before anti-trust intervention. 
All in all, from all the cases, the importance for anti-trust intervention can be seen as an 
SEP holder might take advantages of the dominant position obtained through lock-in effect 
brought about by successful standard, and hold up implementers through extracting 
excessive royalties or imposing discriminatory terms. 153  Interestingly noted here, 
competition rules in such cases function quite initiatively, since behaviour to seek for 
injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEP holders is treated as anti-competitive, unless 
‘safe harbour’ covers. The attitude of competition authorities towards relevant issues is 
quite intense as those SEPs and SEP holders’ business usually involves thousands even 
millions euros, and once anti-competitive effects appear, such effects are enormously huge.  
Just as Vice President of the European Commission -- Joaquín Almunia, who is responsible 
for Competition Policy, said in a speech in 2012, ‘the worst-case scenario is when a 
company willing to take a licence for standard-essential patents on FRAND terms is hit by 
an injunction. Legal battles like these may put the standardisation process at risk and hold 
up innovation in the entire industry.’ There now is a consensus among competition 
authorities that ‘injunctive relief in competition with a FRAND-encumbered SEP should be 
a remedy of last resort.’154 
 
4.5. Consumer Harm? 
Although excessive royalties charged by FRAND-encumbered SEP holders are imposed on 
manufactures or producers or service providers, these disadvantages will finally pass on to 
consumers as the price of final products increases at the same time.155 However, this 
assertion made by Chappatte is also rebutted in the reply as ‘neither Mr Chappatte nor his 
allies of circumstance have made any serious effort to analyze the effect any allegedly 
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unreasonable royalties have had on consumers or the expected effect of any royalty 
reduction on those same consumers.’ The reduction of input will not benefit consumers and 
reduction in royalties would be ‘trivial’, because there is no factual or statistic support for 
the assertion that excessive royalties charged by SEP holders will pass on to consumers.156 
The argument in the reply is again logically reasonable, and there is no strong statistic 
evidence to confute. However, just as there is no strong evidence to show a harm might be 
passed to consumers, there is no strong evidence to prove harms would not be passed to 
consumers. In the condition of a folk in the road like this, while neither side can be 
asserted or proved, whether competition rules intervene or not thus, not relies on the 
evidence to show a harm passed on to consumers or not. Instead, the competition 
authorities take the approach regarding the exclusive effect of abusive behavior of a 
dominant firm on relevant market.  
Through assessing the anti-competitive effect of for example ‘seeking for injunctions’ 
which ‘excludes the most innovative standard-compliant products from the market’, the 
Commission thus is capable of getting the conclusion that such abusive behavior has its 
abusive nature restricting competition, limiting consumer choice and eliminating 
downstream competition.157 Therefore, such an approach does not mean that competition 
authorities leave the harm of consumers totally untouched. Instead, while the Court and the 
Commission lay emphasize on the anti-competitive effect of an abusive behavior of 
dominant firms on whether such behavior excludes competitors on competing market, the 
potential consumer harm is thus proved by this exclusive effect as generally speaking, 
consumers benefit more when there are more competitors on the market. 
Except for addressing harms to consumers through exclusion of competitors and restriction 
of competition, consumer welfare could also be reduced due to other unreasonable and 
discriminatory licensing terms that are incompatible with FRAND, such as ‘termination 
clause’ by single party, ‘old products clause’ and etc. 158  Such terms might be too 
unfavorable to licensees that deter potential participants, as well as deter incentives for 
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further improvements.  
According to the Court’s and the Commission’s practices, excessive royalties alone hardly 
leads to any conclusion of anti-competitive or consumer harm, and apparently, abusive 
standardization happens only when royalties charged are excessive than ‘fair and 
reasonable’ with other ‘exclusionary behavior’ also exercised by SEP holders who also 
produce products and provide services as well as agree to license SEPs to others on 
FRAND terms. Consumer welfare harmed or not can only be treated as secondary factors 
to prove anti-competitive effect of an abusive conduct.  
In fact, it is necessary in any situation to address the possibility of reduction in consumer 
welfare, because if the competition rules are needed to intervene in certain condition, the 
final object for such anti-trust intervention is to protect consumers in final market, not just 
for fairness in the competing market among competitors, which is indeed intermediate goal 
not ultimate one. Competition law is designed ‘to protect competition in the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.’159 
On the other hand, if consumer welfare is totally undistorted and remains in good condition, 
then there might be no need for anti-trust intervention at all. This is in compliant with 
competition authorities’ attitude towards FRAND-encumbered SEPs. For example, they 
treat standardization agreement as normally not restrictive of competition.160 Only when 
such agreement restricts competition and cannot be exempted by Article 101(3), 
competition law then intervenes. As to issues relating to A102, the competition authorities’ 
attitude can be seen from very limited cases of excessive pricing. 
 
4.6. Transferability  
The sale of a SEP is also an important question that lies in the center of FRAND related 
litigation problematically. A SEP holder might seek to transfer the SEP once incorporated 
into a standard to a third party and the particular SEP is subject to FRAND commitments. 
Then is the third party also bound by the FRAND commitments? The importance to 
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address this question first of all lies in the frequent deals on the technology market to 
transfer SEPs. 
 
4.6.1. Various motivations to transfer 
Motivations to transfer a SEP can be diverse. For example, a big SEP holder might 
purchase those SEPs from smaller holders to enlarge the SEP package the owner has and to 
concentrate the ownership of SEPs of a particular standard, which might positively lead to 
a reduction in the transaction costs as well as a reduction in the possibility of royalty 
stacking. Actually, ‘there is consistent anecdotal evidence that large incumbent companies 
monetize part of their portfolio by selling away patents to NPEs or new entrants that seek 
to strengthen their IP position.’161 For instance, in the telecommunication sector, in the 
single year 2012, Intel purchased 1,700 Wi-Fi, 3G, and LTE patents from InterDigital for 
$375 million.162 Another deal was made between IPWireless and Intellectual Ventures and 
NVIDIA that approximately 500 patents were dealt including essential one in LET, 
LET-Advanced, 3G and 4G technologies.163  
 
4.6.2. FRAND also transfers? 
Competition rules are usually regarded as safeguard against those SEP transfers that 
generate anti-competitive effect on the relevant market. ‘To ensure the effectiveness of the 
FRAND commitment, there should also be a requirement on all IPR holders who provide 
such a commitment to take all necessary measures to ensure that any undertaking to which 
the IPR owner transfers its IPR (including the right to license that IPR) is bound by that 
commitment.’164 Both U.S. and EU competition authorities have paid attention to several 
recent cases relating to the sale of SEPs, such as the transfer from Robert Bosch to IPCom 
and the transfer of portfolio SEPs of Motorola and Nortel. Authorities have ‘required the 
new SEPs owner explicitly endorsed past FRAND commitments’. As we all known that 
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such anti-trust intervention carried out by competition authorities are only ex post, and 
authorities so far have only intervened in very limited cases, without well-equipped labors 
and materials for the calculation of economic factors. Also, those cases are going through 
very long and costly legal procedures. ‘Given the actual variety of potential cases, their 
ability to effectively and correctly orient behaviors towards FRAND principles is thus 
limited.’165 
In accordance with the Horizontal Guidelines’ words that FRAND commitments are 
binding even after the particular SEP transferred, this point is again confirmed in SSO 
policies. For example, in ETSI policy, 6.1bis regulates the transfer of ownership of 
essential IPR: ‘FRAND licensing undertakings made pursuant to Clause 6 shall be 
interpreted as encumbrances that bind all successors-in-interest. Recognizing that this 
interpretation may not apply in all legal jurisdictions, any Declarant who has submitted a 
FRAND undertaking according to the POLICY who transfers ownership of ESSENTIAL 
IPR that is subject to such undertaking shall include appropriate provisions in the relevant 
transfer documents to ensure that the undertaking is binding on the transferee and that the 
transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with 
the goal of binding all successors-in-interest. The undertaking shall be interpreted as 
binding on successors-in-interest regardless of whether such provisions are included in the 
relevant transfer documents.’166 Moreover, 6.2 ‘An undertaking pursuant to Clause 6.1 
with regard to a specified member of a PATENT FAMILY shall apply to all existing and 
future ESSENTIAL IPRs of that PATENT FAMILY unless there is an explicit written 
exclusion of specified IPRs at the time the undertaking is made. The extent of any such 
exclusion shall be limited to those explicitly specified IPRs.’167 
Therefore, both Horizontal Guidelines and SSO policies set rules that transfer of a SEP 
does not influence the binding effect of FRAND commitment. However, merely a rule as 
such does not clear everything for licensing parties. As licensing parties might have 
disagreements on what FRAND exactly means, an SEP holder might charge fees 
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significantly above the previous one and still claims that his offer is within the meaning of 
FRAND. The vagueness of FRAND thereby brings about complex issues. Again, licensing 
parties shall first negotiate due to the contractual nature of FRAND commitments. 
 
4.6.3. Joint Selling 
Among various practices of transferring FRAND-encumbered SEPs, joint selling is 
comparatively problematic one, because it concerns with the patent pool. ‘Patent pools can 
be defined as an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of 
their patents to one another or to third parties.’168 SEP holders might joint together to form 
a patent pool and license their patents together in a single package. Generally speaking, 
‘[t]here is no inherent link between technology pools and standards, but the technologies in 
the pool often support, in whole or in part, a de facto or de jure industry standard.’169 
Indeed in telecommunication sector there are typically W-CDMA patent pool which offers 
access to worldwide patents that are essential to the W-CDMA FDD 3GPP standard and 
LTE patent pools for SEPs in LTE standard.  
Technology pools can be pro-competitive. Especially for standards in telecommunication 
sector where there are thousands of SEPs in a single standard, pooling the technology 
provides a one-stop licensing and thus might ‘produce pro-competitive effects, in particular 
by reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumulative royalties to avoid double 
marginalization.’ 170  Technology pools might also be anti-competitive as pooling 
technologies together indicates a joint selling arrangement of patents.  
Then how does FRAND function in joint selling arrangements? In order to discuss this 
question, it is necessary to distinguish between the creation of technology pools and 
licensing out patent package from the pool. Concerning the creation of a technology pool, 
‘as long as a pool is composed entirely of technologies that are “essential”, the creation of 
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the pool will itself be viewed as compatible with Article 101(1).’171 Then to licensing out 
an all-SEP package will not lead to huge divergence on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms generally. Instead, if the creation of a pool is composed of both 
essential patents and non-essential patents, even though the pooled technologies are 
licensed out to all potential licensees on FRAND terms, there still might be huge disputes 
on for example the tying and bundling of SEPs and non-SEPs. For those non-SEPs, 
‘royalties are likely to be higher than they would otherwise be, because licensees do not 
benefit from rivalry between the technologies in question.’172 In extreme situations, ‘the 
joint selling operation involves a technology pool consisting of substantially “substitute” or 
“non-essential” technologies’ might amount to a price fixing cartel. 173  Under such 
circumstances, FRAND does not prevent such joint selling agreements from violating 
Article 101(1), nor does it help the conditions to fall within Article 101(3) and TTBER. 
 
4.7. Standards are Global 
It is even harder to enforce FRAND commitments, as standards issues and licensing issues 
are growingly global problems. Companies operate globally, standards are used globally 
and SSOs are global organizations. Under 3G standard, consumers are expecting that they 
could use cellphones everywhere in the world. 
 
4.7.1. Shopping Forum: Huawei v. IDC 
Different countries understands FRAND commitments differently within their jurisdiction 
and also different courts exercise different criterion on identical issues. Thus a ‘shopping 
forum’ phenomenon might potentially happen as rules in some country might favor one 
party over another. The ‘shopping forum’ phenomenon is well reflected in a series of suits 
between Huawei and IDC in telecommunications sector. The proceeding is indeed very 
interesting.  
Since September 2008, IDC and Huawei have negotiated multiple times in terms of patent 
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royalties in 2G and 3G standard. Since 2009, IDC required Huawei four times to pay 5.3 
hundred million of lumpsum royalties on wireless communication terminal equipment 
from 2009 to 2016 and to pay 5.2 hundred million of lumpsum royalties on wireless 
communication essential equipment from 2009 to 2016. Huawei regarded such 
requirement as unfair clause. Two companies could not reach an agreement and Huawei 
did not pay a penny to IDC.174 
‘In July 2011, to force Huawei to accept its offer, IDC filed a patent infringement lawsuit 
to Delaware District Court, claiming that Huawei and some other companies infringed its 7 
patents in 3G wireless devices manufacturing.’ The same day, IDC required ITC 
(International Trade Commission, hereafter ITC) to launch ‘377 investigation’ also listing 
Nokia and ZTE as appellee, to prohibit Huawei from manufacturing, selling and importing 
relevant products. The investigation started on August 31th 2011. At that time, Huawei has 
already signed a mobile phone customization contract with American communication 
operators. If the investigation finds that Huawei infringes IDC’s patents, ITC would 
impose a Cease and Desist Order on Huawei products, which means that Huawei’s mobile 
phone cannot be exported to American market. 
As a return stroke, Huawei invoked a lawsuit against IDC on December 6th 2011 to 
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court requiring the court basing on FRAND terms to stop 
IDC from excessive pricing, discriminatory pricing, tying and bundling, imposing unfair 
licensing terms and refusing to supply. The court found out that IDC abused its dominant 
position charging unfairly high price, discriminatory pricing and imposing unfair licensing 
terms in early negotiations. Both IDC and Huawei appealed to the Guangdong High 
People’s Court (hereinafter ‘GHPC’). In February 2011 the GHPC affirmed original 
judgment and supported Huawei’s claiming for remedy: RMB 20 million. 
However, this is not the end of the story. In order to increase the bargaining power in this 
competition, Huawei reported to Chinese National Development and Reformation 
Committee (hereafter ‘NDRC’) that IDC abused its dominant position charging unfairly 
high royalties and discriminatory pricing to several communication equipment 
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manufactures. On May 22th 2014, NDRC made an administrative decision regarding the 
anti-monopoly investigation against the IDC, who charges Chinese manufactures almost 
ten times the royalties as in other countries. IDC proposed not to charge Chinese 
enterprises discriminatory and excessive patent licensing royalties. (Along with other 
proposals: not to tying SEPs with non-SEPs in license and not to require a Chinese 
manufacturer to agree to a royalty-free and reciprocal cross license and not to force 
Chinese enterprises to accept unreasonable license conditions through direct legal action. ) 
Here comes the expected part. 
On June 28th 2013, ITC made a preliminary ruling on ‘377 investigation’ held that one of 
the seven patents was declared invalid and the other six were not infringed by Huawei. 
Finally IDC recalled the investigation. Two parties reached a secret reconciliation 
agreement on January 2th 2014.175 
 
4.7.2. Applicability of FRAND commitments 
The very first question put forward before the GHPC ever attempts to judge the case is 
whether FRAND commitment could be used as a legal basis for judgment.  
In the case both Huawei and IDC are members of ETSI, who shall nevertheless be subject 
to ETSI policy as they have agreed during the standard-setting and they all commit to 
license on FRAND terms in that stage. Huawei proves that SEPs provided by IDC in ETSI 
are the same technical level of those in China. Therefore, according to Chinese law, IDC 
shall license patents to Huawei on FRAND terms.  
However IDC argues that Chinese court cannot invoke FRAND as legal basis because the 
ETSI is an organization that locates in France. If GHPC would like to invoke FRAND, it 
shall be understood within the meaning of French law. Following that, IDC argues that 
under French law, FRAND is merely an invitation for negotiation, not a binding contract 
term. GHPC disapproves this argument. Chief Judge Ou Xiuping explains that the alleged 
patents have been approved under Chinese patent law, and therefore Chinese law is 
applicable. Moreover, as both parties agreed on FRAND terms when they join the specific 
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standard, both of them shall be bind by FRAND terms and FRAND naturally becomes a 
part of the licensing contract. Therefore, in this case FRAND can be treated as legal basis 
for judgment.176 
The GHPC first implements FRAND commitments and second interprets it in a way 
almost identical to CJEU. In the case, the court has and only has a very general quotation 
of FRAND commitment, let alone the exact meaning of fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory. As to the content of the case, the judge also decides identically as 
previous case decided by CJEU. The most interesting part of the case is whether FRAND 
commitments can be invoked as legal basis for judgment in private jurisdiction worldwide? 
The answer of course shall depend. It depends on factual and legal conditions in a 
particular case, whether licensing parties are both members of a SSO; whether the SEP 
holder agrees on FRAND commitments; whether national law applicable and etc. It thus 
can be foreseen that disputes with regard to FRAND-encumbered SEPs will be more and 
more complicated in the context of globalization. 
 
5. FRAND commitment and Competition Law 
FRAND commitment is designed as an industry solution to deal with risks raised in the 
process of standardization such as patent hold-up, patent thicket, royalty stacking and so on. 
Non-cooperative strategies as such in fact slow down the dissemination of the standard, 
and thus reduce the profits that other SEP holders should have earned if they act in 
accordance with FRAND commitments. However, although FRAND commitments 
function effectively and deter such risks to certain extent, these strategies still exist or at 
least are not perfectly prevented. Moreover, FRAND commitments per se also give rise to 
difficulty to reach agreement on what FRAND exactly means in the concrete situations.  
As FRAND commitments are in nature contractual terms, disputes relating to fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties and terms shall first be dealt with among 
licensing parties. ‘Cases of disputes arising in relation to the terms and conditions offered 
by the right holder could be resolved if necessary by arbitration.’ However, in situations 
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where a standard is so successful that the whole industry is locked in to the standard for 
example 3G standard, such a negotiation might be easily impeded due to the strong 
bargaining power of SEP holders. If such a SEP holder also acts in the downstream 
products market, he could easily occupy a dominant position. Under such circumstances, 
the SEP licensing agreements might be caught by Article 101 and the abusive behavior of 
the dominant undertaking might violate Article 102. The anti-trust intervention thus is 
necessary where competition on the relevant market is prevented, restricted or distorted.  
However, the fact is that EU competition law rarely intervenes. In fact, conventionally the 
only FRAND issues that are discussed in front of the Court and the Commission are cases 
relating to seeking injunctions. The hands of competition authorities are apparently tied. 
Competition policy is so limited that it can only stand on the side and behave 
complementary coping with obviously anti-competitive foreclosure activities and 
injunctions, which leaves detailed FRAND issues to be dealt with between contractual 
parties.  
Therefore, FRAND commitments and EU competition law function like two circles 
intersected with a part of both circles coincide. FRAND commitments affect the licensing 
terms between SEP holders and standard implementers, putting some restrictions on both 
parties, which by no means influence the normal application of competition rules. FRAND 
commitments neither immune licensing agreements from competition rules, nor place them 
in disadvantages. In fact, competition law works in a way as it used to be. It only 
intervenes when agreements ‘have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market’177 or dominant undertakings conduct 
abusively ‘within the internal market or in a substantial part of it’.178 Hence, perceptions 
such as FRAND is capable of alleviate competition authorities’ supervision on SEP 
licensing issues are totally wrong. Competition authorities on the other hand have to deal 
with FRAND-encumbered SEPs more carefully as FRAND per se leads to ambiguous 
licensing issues. 
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5.1. The role of Competition Law 
Those who disapproves the application of competition rules to enforce FRAND 
commitments worry about the risks result from anti-trust intervention. Firstly, ‘FRAND 
commitments could be meaningless.’179 Secondly, ‘there will be no constraints on the 
royalties that can be charged for patents essential for existing standards such GSM and 
UMTS.’180 Thirdly, more royalty claims will result in higher costs for standardized 
products. Fourthly, there will be a reduction in incentives to invest in new technology.181   
Such voices are untenable. They are fundamentally wrong about the role of competition 
rules in addressing FRAND-encumbered SEP issues. The role of competition law is indeed 
neutral. The meaning of neutral can be shown at least in two scenarios. In the first place, 
competition authorities upon applying the competition rules do not touch practical pricing 
issues. The Court and the Commission in dealing with relevant issues, are neither equipped 
nor willing to act as ‘price regulators’, and this may be why they only give ‘guidance’ on 
issues leaving the pricing first for the licensing parties and then for national courts. 
Anti-trust law and relevant case law do not expand merits to the extent that it might impede 
the creation of private arrangements. Any attempt for them to decide what kind of price is 
excessive, which level of royalties is fair and reasonable, or what sort of terms are 
non-discriminatory, inherently embeds insuperable practical difficulties. This explains why 
since the adoption of Article 1/2003, the Commission only has very limited intervention in 
price control targeting at dominant firms in exceptional circumstances.  
In addition, competition authorities upon applying the competition rules not only care 
about protecting fundamental IP rights, but also care about the minimum freedom in 
competition. As repeatedly emphasize in case law, competition authorities ‘strike a fair 
balance between the fundamental rights and freedoms at stake.’182 However, while making 
effort to balance, neither the Court nor the Commission regards fundamental IP rights and 
freedom in competition as of same importance. Also, such balance is not made by simply 
adding components on both sides. Instead, there is a hierarchy between competition law 
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and IP law. 
Indeed, FRAND is merely an outcome of fast developing high technologies, accompanying 
standardization. Despite FRAND, there are a lot of other contractual terms such as 
free-royalty term. There is no need for competition authorities to treat them in a different 
manner. If competition authorities have to take each terms independently into full 
consideration, they will be busy doing that all the time. Therefore, the necessity for 
anti-trust intervention lies in an overall competitive or anti-competitive effect on the 
market as a result of the conduct of relevant licensing parties. 
 
5.2. Competition Law and IP Law 
As discussed in previous parts, while the Court and the Commission solve problems 
regarding FRAND-encumbered SEPs, both competition authorities have to balance 
between the fundamental intellectual property right and the freedom of competition. Here 
exists a tricky point that there is a hierarchy between the two systems. This view is not 
addressed on the basis that the IPRs are subject to competition law because the former is 
national-wide, and the latter is central in TFEU. Instead, ‘IPRs have increasingly become 
Community-wide laws’.183 However, even though IP laws are public law that regulates 
market behavior, ‘once an individual obtains the grant of an IPR, the right is a private 
property right.’ 184  The exercise of such a private right is nevertheless subject to 
competition law. Therefore, competition law is able to act de facto as external limit to IPRs. 
Hence, it is important for licensing parties to take into consideration before exercising their 
IPRs and before acting anti-competitively on the market that their IPRs are subject to 
competition law and the balancing made by competition authorities does not mean that 
IPRs and competition rules are equally important. 
Moreover, the fact that private IPRs are subject to competition law does not necessarily 
mean that competition law and IP law inherently conflict with each other. Instead, ‘both 
bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and an 
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efficient allocation of resources.’185 Besides, both IP law and competition law promote 
innovation and ensure competition.  
Although the goal of IP law and the goal of competition law are designed to be coherent 
and consistent with each other, the exercise of private IPRs can be abusive enough to raise 
competition concerns. The deduction applies to FRAND commitment. FRAND is a 
mechanism designed also to prevent abusive patent hold-up, to ensure accessibility to the 
standard and to prevent excessive royalties, which is indeed to promote standards, to 
promote innovation on both technology market and product market and to ensure a 
competitive downstream product market. Therefore, the ultimate goal of FRAND shall be 
in consistent with both IP law and competition law. However, there are abusive conducts 
taking advantage of FRAND commitments to impede normal competition, the most 
obvious example of which is to seek injunctions especially as a threat to extract excessive 
royalties or to impose unfair licensing terms. Thus, there is always a byway around the hill. 
Market players will always be able to find some flaws in the current policy or legal regime 
and legal systems per se are not perfect. Anti-trust intervention here shall act more like a 
safeguard for a competitive market, no matter how market players behave or negotiate or 
collude. 
 
5.3. A case-by-case Analysis 
However, the work of safeguard is not easy to accomplish. Competition authorities have to 
ponder over in what circumstances anti-trust intervention is necessary. Such intervention 
must neither on one hand regulate too much to undermine fundamental IPRs, nor on the 
other hand not regulate enough so that competition is significantly restricted, prevented 
and distorted and consumer welfare is harmed. However, there is no set exercises that the 
Court and the Commission can apply mechanically and real situations are always more 
complex. Therefore, competition authorities have to apply competition rules on a 
case-by-case basis. Such a case-by-case analysis is especially vital in FRAND-encumbered 
SEP issues, because licensing conditions can be extremely different and as to successful 
standard in telecommunications the figure of royalties involved can be really huge. 
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Therefore, a case-by-case analysis is a core requirement before competition authorities are 
able to make any decision.  
Despite a theoretical balancing, there are more practical issues that competition authorities 
face with before they open an investigation. To whoever talks about FRAND commitments 
and related legal and factual context, it is always easy to express the point of view that 
issues regarding FRAND-encumbered SEPs shall be discussed on a case-by-case basis. 
However, when the Court or the Commission really face with such a case for example the 
Motorola case, they have to be very careful about any analysis no matter in legal context or 
in economic context. They might have to spend costly resources in order to carry out such 
analysis. Also, they have to take into consideration the budget of the whole department. 
For example, how many investigations they can afford in a year. Therefore, a case-by-case 
analysis is what should be done but what is difficult to be done. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The FRAND licensing regime works effectively as an industry solution in preventing risks 
such as patent hold-up, excessive royalties and in ensuring accessibility to a particular 
standard. However, FRAND is not perfect. FRAND-encumbered SEPs are problematic 
enough to raise anti-trust concerns. The necessity for anti-trust intervention lies 
fundamentally in the contractual nature of FRAND. The vagueness of FRAND and the 
difficulties in defining a FRAND already indicate a percentage of disputes among licensing 
parties. Moreover, in practice, such necessity may also be realized where licensing parties 
may not agree on FRAND at all; may deceive in the standard-setting stage thus not bound 
by FRAND; may change their minds to breach FRAND commitments and may seek 
injunctions as a threat to extract excessive royalties. Therefore, anti-trust intervention is 
necessary as safeguard to guarantee a normal and competitive market both upstream and 
downstream. 
However, competition law alone is also insufficient enough to solve these risks perfectly, 
because anti-trust intervention occurs only after a real anti-competitive effect happens on 
the real market and the detriments to consumers have been created. Any potential remedies 
for the harm have to wait until a decision of protracted and complex litigation. Thus, 
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anti-trust intervention as such is hysteretic and the anti-competitive effect and consumer 
welfare may ‘be magnified by the inherently ex post nature of antitrust remedies’.186  
Therefore, in order to prevent such risks to the greatest extent, prevention is always better 
than remedy. Merely relying on anti-trust intervention is not very practical and effective. 
Indeed every party that participates in the standardization process is able to help. Licensing 
parties can help by abiding by FRAND commitments and behave competitively. SSOs can 
help by making FRAND work better. Competition authorities can help by keeping an eye 
on the market and applying competition rules neutrally. Therefore, it depends on every 
market participant to make the market function better and to make the society better. 
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